S&T Supplement

The S&T SUPPLEMENT is a supplement to Strategy & Tactics Magazine whose primary purpose is to give the readers of S&T the opportunity to say pretty much whatever they like

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outgoing mail

Editor

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FEEDBACK RESULTS FOR:

SUPPLEMENT # 3, June-July 1970

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HOW WOULD YOU RATE THIS ISSUE OVERALL? Use the numbered codes below. 0= A total loss; 1,2 or 3=inadequate to fair. 4,5,6=about average; 7 or 8= above average; 9=Outstanding. Use one number.	37	6.0
ON THE BASIS OF THIS ISSUE, would you resubscribe right now? Put a 1 in the box if YES, a 2 if NO	38	1.6

This issue of the Supplement will follow right on the heels of issue #4. This is perhaps the WORST delay in the short history of the Supplement (so far that is). Please accept my humblest apologies for the great delay, but our printer was unable to print #4 on time.

The 1914 PBM is still in progress as I understand.

You should note that there are 2 Leipzig Revised articles between the two issues. This was not intentional, but the results should prove interesting.

Tragedy & Tactix is still in the offing. The decision to publish this wargame and historical satire as a special issue of the Supplement will solely depend upon a plurality of "yes" votes giving ye olde editor the go-ahead. The question concerning Tragedy & Tactix is reprinted in this issue and will be counted separately from the Feedback question of #4.

As of now (10/15/70; 7:40 EDT) no particular date nor issue # has been specified for T'n'T.

PARTISAN WARFARE IN THE SOVIET UNION 1941-1944 PART 1

By STEPHEN TANG

"In the occupied territories partisan units must be formed . . . . There must be diversionist groups for fighting enemy units, for spreading the partisan war everywhere, for blowing up and destroying roads and bridges and telephone and telegraph wires; for setting fire to forests, enemy stores and road convoys. In the occupied areas intolerable conditions must be created for the enemy and his accomplices, who must be persecuted and destroyed at every step . . ."

Stalin--eleven days after the German invasion of the Soviet Union

There are few facets of World War II on which more people harbor a greater number of misconceptions and vague notions than that of partisan warfare in the Soviet Union. Information on the subject in English is vested in a few, relatively obscure books. This article attempts to bridge this information gap.

When the German armies moved into Russia, the possibility of a partisan movement entered into Soviet thinking. Indeed, the revolutionary traditions of the U.S.S.R. (the Civil War and the Wars of Foreign Intervention) practically dictated that partisan warfare be conducted; both for military and for political reasons. Militarily because it would do useful sabotage and intelligence work, politically since it would give Home Front morale a shot in the arm, strengthen the Soviet position abroad, and retain Soviet control over the people in occupied territory. Thus, soon after BARBAROSSA began, the Soviets threw together hundreds of partisan units and hoped that the masses in occupied territory would rally to the colors.

These early partisan units took several forms. Some were small (6-8 men) parachute teams whose function was to destroy industrial facilities left behind, undamaged, to the Germans. Others were Party companies whose mission was to raise as much hell as possible. Another group was the NKVD (Narodni Kommisariat Vnutrennikh Del--People's Commisaissariat for Internal Affairs, or, Secret Police) Annihilation or Destroyer regiments. These regiments were composed of Party members and other political "reliables" whose job was originally to defend Red Army rear areas against German parachute attacks. As the Soviet armies retreated, their job was changed to partisan warfare in the German rear. A little later, in July, the Party formed Combat Battalions and Diversionary units for partisan work. Needless to say, this multiplicity of types caused a considerable amount of confusion. I have been unable to uncover the number of partisan units and types actually employed in mid-1941. I doubt if even the Soviet government has accurate figures such was the confusion and

panic in that summer. As an aside, all of the tables shown in this article for partisan organization are only typical since units in the field were forced to make cuts, additions, and even complete realignments. Despite the imposing titles and assigned missions, the 1941 partisan bands were almost never effective.

For personnel, the movement had three main sources: the peasantry, army stragglers from the 1941 summer fiasco, and Party members. In the early days of the war, Party members often made up half a unit's strength, up to 80% in some cases. These men had been organized by the Party specifically for partisan work. This is not to say that they had been trained, however. The Party men were taken straight from their desks and factories and given a partisan command or mission. Some cut it and learned their new trade. Most of them sluffed off their new responsibility. The peasants and the stragglers were not so eager to join up. In fact, they usually shied away from partisan service until it became apparent to them that the Soviet Union was sure to win the war. With conscripted and reluctant Party members and rank-and-file, the partisans were hardly a "spontaneous" movement as some Russian propaganda would like us to believe. The units that were formed as a rule had few weapons and even less ammunition after a few skirmishes--with no way of replacing expenditures. Many Soviet minorities (notably the Ukrainians) greeted the Germans as a welcome change to the Russians. And if all this was not enough to cripple the movement, Party members did not make up for their inexperience with enthusiasm. Working toward "eventual victory" mucking about in a swamp instead of behind a plushy desk made little sense to them (does it to anyone?).

With all these black marks against them, it is no wonder that morale among the early partisans was, by and large, very low. The swift advance of the German armies, the apparent lack of effective resistance by the Red Army, and the pragmatic absence of any ideal (i.e. Mother Russia) or faith in eventual victory were the causes. When the leaders of cadre became casualties, the Germans about to annihilate their unit, or when starvation or cold became unbearable, whole battalions were liable to dissolve. Says Ziemke, "Those partisan units that did appear were small, ineffective, usually isolated, and in constant danger of disintegrating." During the Soviet Winter offensive of 1941-1942, the Russians used Red Army commandos, parachutists and cavalry units to disrupt the German rear areas. The very use of these units indicate that the Army had little faith in the ability of the partisans to do the work themselves in the required quantity. So the partisan movement in 1941 was ineffective not because of German reaction, but because of internal disorganization, confusion, and lack of material.

Following the rebirth of Soviet military strength in the Winter offensive, Soviet prestige rose accordingly among the people in occupied territory so that it generally was on par with the Germans'. The fact that the Soviet regime was not finished, coupled to the fact that Nazi rule with its terror and horror was nothing to look forward to, gave the peasants and workers a sense of quasi-patriotism. Taking advantage of this and the fact that German units in reserve were being moved to the front to fill gaps, the Soviets began organizing a partisan movement in earnest. Gone were the days when it was thought that Party

men with no training in warfare could organize a successful partisan movement. Gone were the days when spontaneous rebellion was seriously thought of. Now trained personnel from both the Party and the Army organized, trained, and armed "brigades" of 1,000 men or more. Brigade organization differed widely in size throughout the Soviet Union depending on local conditions such as available equipment, manpower, arms, etc.

Training simply acquainted the partisan recruit with his weapons, tactics, duties, etc. Just as in any army. Discipline became strict because of the Army officers. Some men were given specialist training; demolitions, telegraph, railroad work, even pickpocketing. This training was conducted behind Soviet lines and the graduates from the various schools dropped to the partisans.

The brigades were well-equipped with small arms and machine guns, both light and heavy. For heavier support, anti-tank rifles, anti-tank guns, and mortars were used. On the whole, Soviet weapons were excellent. By 1943, the partisans were often better armed than the second and third-rate German outfits fighting them.

Air supply was increased so as not to force the partisans to spend most of their time trying to capture weapons and ammunition. The necessity of air supply to the movement becomes apparent when the fact that virtually all mines, explosives, weapons and ammunition consumed by the partisans were brought in by air becomes known. In 1942 there were about 175,000 partisans; this gives some idea of the magnitude and importance of air supply.

The surviving 1941 units and the new brigades (usually formed on the bones of an earlier outfit) were brought under central Russian control by radio and air, thus coordinating them somewhat with the Red Army.

Now the movement began picking up more and more recruits and conscripts (by far the majority) from the two previously little-tapped sources: the peasantry and the stragglers. The peasants generally came in when food was scarce because of partisan and German needs, or when they were "recruited" by the partisans. The stragglers came in to get back in favor with the regime since the Soviet government regarded all stragglers as deserters: partisan work was their last chance to redeem themselves. The Germans also upped partisan manpower by deporting people like cattle, committing atrocities, employing slave labor, and in general, making life as a partisan more attractive than death at the hands of the Germans.

Both groups, along with the majority of the people of the U.S.S.R. saw that the Soviets would probably win the war. By the middle of 1942, the movement numbered between 150,000 and 200,000 men. Nine-tenths of these were based behind German lines in North and Central Russia where there were vast forests and swamps. In the open steppe of the Ukraine and South Russia however, the partisan movement was a small factor in both Soviet and German planning.

In 1943, the movement's strength leveled off at around 250,000 men. Organization was the key word for the rest of the war. The

brigades were under the command now of either the "front" (army group) command opposite them if they were close to the front, or Moscow directly if they were deep in occupied territory. The most significant and important feature of this period was the consolidation of several brigades into complexes, complexes being simply a bunch of brigades under a single commander. Some of these complexes contained up to 18,000 men and complexes of 5,000 or more men were not uncommon.

The Soviets had several reasons for grouping the partisans into complexes. One was that it simplified external supply. Supplies could simply be air-lifted to the complex and then distributed by the complex staff. They supposedly denied great numbers of people and large areas of land to the Germans. They supposedly formed a "second front" on which the Red Army would advance to crush the Germans. It improved partisan morale (never very strong) since even medium-sized complexes (5,000 men), were safe from all but large-scale offensives. Complexes often went months without any serious assault or operation against them. Lastly, they promoted discipline and political orthodoxy: very important in Russia. It prevented political diversion such as in Yugoslavia where the two factions were more interested in fighting each other than the Germans and Italians. It also largely precluded a widespread resistance movement against the Soviet government when it returned such as in the Ukraine after World War I. Indeed, there were some Ukrainian partisans to whom it mattered little whether they were killing Germans or Russians. Some were still fighting the Russians in 1947.

Many of these explanations however, do not hold up under careful examination. Supply of several small groups would not have been that much more difficult than the supply of one large one if there was adequate communication between the Air Force and the partisans. Drop zones would not have been a problem since the Germans did not patrol very actively at night if they knew the partisans to be aggressive.

Since most partisan complexes were in deep forest or swamp areas, they controlled relatively few people and little tillable land. In the populous Ukraine, the Germans were virtually free to economically exploit the land and people as they pleased. Even in North Russia where partisans were very active and tillable acreage was small, Army Group North lived entirely off the land through 1943. The one thing that the partisans effectively kept the Germans from using was lumber. Lumber shortages plagued the Germans in everything from bunkers to mining operations.

As for the "strength through numbers" argument, no complex ever successfully held off an attack by regular German troops. Even second and third-rate German security and collaborator troops were a match for the partisans. Lacking mobility through motorization or horses, they could not help one another when under attack. Ziemke has compared them to the by-passed Japanese islands in the Pacific Theater.

This is as good a time as any to discuss anti-partisan operations so here goes. Hitler's idea of overcoming the partisans is typified by his order in January 1943 (Führer Directive #46) which stated that soldiers engaged in anti-partisan operations could not be brought to trial for any atrocities committed. And

although many generals avoided obeying the order to the "T", killing civilians along with partisans did not bother them greatly. After all, a nation that could conjure up an Auschwitz could certainly bump off a "few" civilians in the course of military operations.

When there were skirmishes with partisans, the Germans took reprisals against the local peasants which usually meant the killing of innocent civilians, the partisans having slipped away. Once again it was the civilians who suffered the most--not the combatants. When the Germans decided that a complex had caused enough trouble to merit an attack (incentive for the partisans to limit their activities), they first threw a line around it and then moved in.

Operations KUGLEBLITZ (Ball Lightning) and REGENSCHAUER-FRUEHLINGFEST (Rain Shower-Spring Festival) are good examples of two similar attacks that achieved quite different results. The Germans' standard procedure for an operation against a complex was first to form a line around the complex and then slowly move in, frustrating any attempt by the encircled partisans to break out.

The basic Soviet plan was to either leak-out the men in small squad-sized units, or to punch a hole in the usually, thin German line and then disperse. Later when the Germans left, the partisans would come back to restore and rebuild the complex.

LEIPZIG REVISED

by PATRICK NIX

The idea of a redesign of the LEIPZIG game is to make it a smoother playing game, eliminate the bulk, and to keep the game realistic.

The original LEIPZIG game contains the essential background of the real situation. This, I think, is not enough. Just as in WATERLOO where units and commanders enrich the game, the same could and can apply to LEIPZIG.

Along with this variant are included: a new order of battle, armies and nationities, and a revised combat results table plus an option on desertion and a longer monthly time table.

The first and main complaint is about the units. Units in the original game are as follows: (see unit changes at end of article)

One now asks, "Why the elimination of army units, supplies, and engineers?" Also; "Why the cut in fighting strength and movement?"

Army units are rather ridiculous when one has five different armies on the board to start with. Not only that but their mobility is almost nil. The discard of supplies and engineers was that they bog the game down. It took any where from two to four turns for a supply unit to reach the battle area. This cut drastically the number of attacks. The engineers are fine for

a tactical game but in a strategy game such as LEIPZIG they just get in the way.

The reason for the reduction of movement and fighting factors is this . . . The units have too much mobility for the area contained on the mapboard and the times in consideration. Fighting factors were reduced to accommodate movement and to eliminate forays by single corps or divisions which did not take place very often in the actual campaign.

Terrain effects upon movement and combat are much the same, however there are a few changes.

Rivers are any square containing rivers or parts of rivers. Any unit may cross a river by bridge without loss of any movement factors. (Editors note only to the extent of the unit's movement factor). If crossing a river without a bridge the unit must stop on the river and then proceed at normal movement rate the next turn. One may move up and down a river at no cost of movement factors as long as one does not cross. Defending units double when being attacked across rivers even if on another river.

Mountain squares are any squares with whole or partial mountain shadings. One may move through the edge of mountains and mountain passes at no cost of movement. Units, when moving through mountains, move at the rate of one square per turn. All units double on defense when on mountain squares.

Cities cost no movement factors except when a unit is crossing a river square through a city. Cities double the defender's fighting factor.

With the elimination of supply units all units have to trace an unmolested, clear supply route to their depots. This supply route may run through different terrains. Units can't attack unless supplied and they have only one turn to be relieved if cut off.

The build-up and breakdown of units takes in the attacking ratios of divisions to corps. Any and all units with fighting potential may be stacked three high. One corp can be broken down into two divisions. The inverse also holds. When building or breaking down in infantry or cavalry they must be of the same fighting branch. They must march to a common square to do this. Headquarter and depot units have no stacking restrictions.

Defections are an added rule where if the first five turns of the game the allied player destroys six French corps with the loss of three or less of his then Wrede's Bavarians come in under the allies in Bavaria and a free German corp may be placed anywhere west of Lutzen and not in Austria.

The time factor has been changed from ten moves per player to fourteen in a sequence of months. It starts December 1812 and ends on January 1814. The battle of Leipzig was in October 1813. This gives an extra three months to the players. As in the original game the first move belongs to the allies.

Napoleon doubles all adjacent French units in attack or on the defensive. He can not be eliminated by a "soak off" battle.

Victory conditions consist of the same rules as in the original LEIPZIG game with one addition. If the French are driven west of Madgeburg-Leipzig-Chemnitt and the western Austrian border then the Allies win.

Naturally in the test game series advice can't be given for they are in a test stage. At this point I would like to say that in my experiences with both sides certain strategies prove most fruitful.

The Allies - The burden of attack was meant to be on the Allied player's shoulders. He must use the strategies used in the original campaign. Move with all your armies. When the army containing Napoleon confronts one then retreat with the defender while all the other armies advance. The usual outcome is the closing of a vise such as in the original battle. Keep your different armies together, don't spread out, and a campaign in the first five months with a victory and defections could bring an easy final victory. With the Allied superiority one almost has nothing to lose.

The French - The French have a burdensome job. Outnumbered and with enemies on three sides the French must sortee out to meet the Allies main assault or else throw as much of his forces at a single allied army hoping to crush it before the other armies become threatening. If you become bogged down against one army then break hostilities and regroup. All three armies (not including the Russian army coming on) are susceptible to attack and possible annihilation. Do not leave Napoleon hanging out on a limb and use him in as many attacks as possible.

Both players should keep in mind not to spread out in long lines, to protect his depots, and that retreat has nothing to do with loss of victory. (Unless when the French are pushed back past Chemnitt.) Also remember to send cavalry out to sortee with the intentions of destroying a depot or to hold up enemy forces or both.

ORIGINAL UNITS



REDESIGN UNITS



ORDER OF BATTLE

ARMY OF BOHEMIA - Schwarzenberg
180,000 men in 10 infantry and 1 cavalry corps

Metzko	Au	Ostermann	Ru	Barclay de Tolly	Ru
Walmoden	Au	Wittgenstein	Ru		
Colloredo	Au	Tettonborn	Ru		
Gyulai	Au	Winzinrode	Ru		
Klenau	Au	Guards	Ru		

ARMY OF THE NORTH - Bernadotte
135,000 men in 5 infantry and 4 cavalry corps

Bulow	Pr	Sandels	Sw
Tauentzien	Pr	Toll	Sw
Stein	Pr		

ARMY OF SILESIA - Blucher
95,000 men in 4 corps infantry and 1 corp cavalry

Kleist	Pr	Tschitshagov	Ru
Yerck	Pr	Pahlen	Ru
Sacken	Pr		

RUSSIAN REINFORCEMENT ARMY - Bennigsen
57,000 men in 3 infantry and 1 cavalry corps

Bennigsen
Tolstoi
Cossack Gds.

Wrede's Bavarian and I Free German corps

Napoleon - French Army

Reynier	14 corps	Kellerman	4 corps
Oudinot	infantry	Latour	cavalry
Marmont		Arrighi	
Ney		Seirs	
Macdonald			
Victor			
Mortier			
Lobau			
Bertrand			
St. Cyr			
Vandemme			
Besseries			
Lauriston			
Poniatowski			

THE FRENCH ARMY



THE ALLIED ARMY



Counters by Fred Schacter

COMBAT RESULTS TABLE

Die	1-4	1-3	1-2	1-1	2-1	3-1	4-1	5-1*
1	AE	AE	AE	DE	DE	DE	DE	DE
2	AS	AS	DS	DS	DS	DS	DS	DE
3	AE	AS	DS	DS	DS	DE	DE	DE
4	AE	AE	AS	AS	AS	DS	DE	DE
5	AS	AS	AS	AS	AS	DS	DS	DE
6	AE	AE	AE	AE	DE	DE	DE	DE

AE - ATTACKER ELIMINATED

AS - ATTACKER RETREATS TWO; AND BREAKS DOWN TO DEFENDER'S OPTION

DS - REVERSE OF AS

DE _ DEFENDER ELIMINATED

TIME RECORD CHART

GAME	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1812 DEC																	
1813 JAN																	
FEB																	
MAR																	
* APR DEFECTIONS END																	
MAY																	
JUNE																	
JULY																	
AUG																	
SEPT																	
OCT																	
NOV																	
DEC																	
1814 JAN																	

BLITZKRIEG ARMS RACE VARIATION

By MARTIN C. CAMPION

This variation assumes that the Blitzkrieg module system is in effect.

1. At the beginning of the game, neither of the great powers has any OB, but all of the small countries have their armies in place. The small countries are completely meutral. There is no war going on. No "general war" starts unless one of the great powers declares war on the other immediately after the violation of a small country border. A general war begins automatically if one of the great powers invades the other or bombs or bombards the sacred soil of the other.

2. Meanwhile there is "peace". During peacetime, the arms race is conducted by investment moves, each of which is the equivalent of 9

regular moves. At the beginning of each investment move, each great power gets 80 investment points. He decides secretly how he will spend them and writes down his investment schedule. The two players then display their schedules simultaneously. Then the units are placed on the board.

If either player wishes to move any units, he may then do so, taking as many turns to do so as he needs up to a maximum od nine. When both players have no such business, the play proceeds immediately to the next investment move. During the regular peacetime moves. During the regular peacetime moves, either player may overrun a minor country. If the other player does not declare war immediately, peace continues. Again, a general war begins with such a declaration or with an invasion etc. of a major power. As soon as a general war begins, the acquisition of investment points ends and the game proceeds like any other game.

3. Investment points may be spent on fighting and support units, in which case they have the same value as the same number of production points. Or, they may be spent on production centers, at this rate:

a (12) point production center costs 43 investment points
a (10) point production center costs 35 investment points
a (5) point production center costs 17 investment points
a (4) point production center costs 13 investment points
a (2) point production center costs 6 investment points

The production centers go into operation when general war begins and investment points end.

4. Optional Rules and further variations.

A. Production points from production centers can be added on to investment points beginning with investment turn after the production center was built. Production centers cannot produce at their wartime level of every other regular move - things move more slowly during peacetime.

B. Each investment schedule is written down a full investment move in advance, before the previous investment schedule is revealed.

C. Guerilla rule: Small countries which are overrun before a general War breaks out cannot form guerrillas at any time thereafter. If a small country is overrun and its invasion causes the war or if it is overrun after the war has begun, it may form guerrillas in accordance with the normal rules.

D. If a power overruns a small country without bringing on a general war, that power receives 20 extra investment points on its next investment turn only. (25 for S.E., 30 for N.W.).

E. One power (a peace loving democracy) gets 100 investment points per investment turn, but has to put all 100 in the first turn into production centers until the other power (an aggressive dictatorship) violates one minor country. Then the p.l.d. has complete freedom of investment, but it cannot violate any minor country borders until after a general war begins. It may start the general war in the normal way. The p.l.d. may stack production centers two high. The a.d. must violate a minor country immediately after investment turn # 6 if he has not done so already. If the a.d. intends to build more than 2 T F Counting those he has built already) or more than 2 L S T (counting those he has built already) he must announce this fact before writing his investment schedule. This announcement gives the p.l.d. player complete freedom of investment from that point on.

For all variations, the powers may not build any units if the appropriate counters are not available, but they may build using what are normally substitute counters.