#9 S&T Supplement

The S&T SUPPLEMENT is published every other month as a supplement to STRATEGY AND TACTICS magazine. One, six issue subscription is $3.00 payable to SIMULATIONS PUBLICATIONS.
Back issues are available at $.75 per copy.

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34 East 23rd St.
New York 10010

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FIRST CLASS MAIL

An Exhortation ①

As STRATEGY & TACTICS has moved into the area of major articles on major subjects, together with a game an issue, the situation of which the poet spoke has arisen:"the moving finger writes, and having writ, moves on . . ."

To some people, once over a subject isn't sufficient to sate their interest. Moreover, this, perforce, leads to an abandonment of a number of the elements originally seen in S&T, and dearly beloved by wargamers, such as Perfect Game Plans and Playable Revisions. The first, Perfect Game Plans, is somewhat like The One True Religion in that there are as many opinions as there are people playing. The second may end up, often as not, being a contradiction in terms as tinkering with the rules of a game often upsets a rather delicate balance such that while the particular problem which plagued the Revisionist is solved, the solution creates many more which did not exist as the game was originally written.

Finally, there is the problem of esoterica: the articles on little corners of wargaming without wide-spread appeal but with devout following or the articles which illuminate a facet of history but which would, again, appeal only to a limited few.

The foregoing two paragraphs have two things in common - they deal with things which S&T has, perforce, begun to abandon and which will appear more and more in the SUPPLEMENT. The SUPPLEMENT, done without all of the frills of S&T, can afford to try an article on a given subject without being so dependant upon reader reaction being fully in support of printing such an article.

The point of the exhortation is that this type of article does not appear out of the clear blue sky. As some may have realized, by and large the articles which appear in STRATEGY & TACTICS are generated by the people whose names appear on the masthead or, if written by someone else, are usually subjected to an extensive program of rewriting, in conjunction with the original author, in order to get the S&T style and quality. Some people submit articles in recognition of the fact that S&T doesn't generate articles out of whole cloth. By the normal law of averages, most of these articles will not see publication in S&T, the primary reason being the esoteric nature of the subject matter or the fact that it is of the "Perfect Game Plan" nature.

The SUPPLEMENT and GAME DESIGN afford an opportunity for some of these articles (the majority, in fact) to see print. Again, though, they won't be printed until written and submitted. That means YOU, the reader, have to submit material if the SUPPLEMENT is to keep having a purpose. It has the stated purpose of presenting materials submitted to S&T for which there is not enough space. It follows that unless material is submitted, there will be nothing to print.

Once you do submit, obviously, this does not guarantee that it will be printed. The editors will look the submission over and if there is a major flaw which can be salvaged, send it back with suggestions. If it is basically good enough to go, you will be advised that it will be used. We will do a little with the grammar and sentence structure but basically, if you send something, put it in the language that you would expect to see in print because we will not do an extensive re-write at this end. In otherwords, unlike S&T, we won't do an extensive re-write if it's needed - we'll send it back to you.

The net result will be a less homogeneous style; the language will vary in that one article may be quite erudite while the other breezy and in the second person.

If you have something you want to see in the SUPPLEMENT which you suspect won't appear in S&T, write it up. We may surprise you and use it. We may surprise you and use it in S&T. The benefits of seeing print in the SUPPLEMENT are mostly personal. There is no money in it (maybe someday); you get to see your name and verbiage in print and get a copy of the issue ahead of the normal subscribers.

So the exhortation is this: write something in the area of wargaming and send it to us. Simulations Publications, Inc., between STRATEGY AND TACTICS, SUPPLEMENT, GAME DESIGN and TEST SERIES GAMES hopes one day to spread-eagle the wargame field so that somewhere amidst what is put out, there will be something on every item of interest to wargamers. The genesis of this ambition has to lie with those who submit materials for use.

Book Reviews (2)

by Fred H. Vietmeyer

In playing with waterline model ships of 1:1200 and 1:1250 scale of early World War II, an interesting dash of color can be added to the game.

Instead of having the ships various hues of dull grey or, at best, some sort of camouflage, why not paint the original merchant line colors or passenger line colors? But where can you find the information?

Two books available are:

Frank E. Dodman
THE OBSERVER'S BOOK OF SHIPS
Frederick Warne & Co., Ltd.
London & New York

E.C. Talbot-Booth, R.D., R.N.V.R.
WHAT SHIP IS THAT?
Didier Publishing Co.
New York, 1944

The first book shows various major commercial fleet lines in color. Here you get the colors of funnels, hulls, superstructures, masts, etc. But the book does not show the types of ships each line had.

For this you must go to the second book, which not only gives the ship type and silhouette, but also identifies each ship with the line to which it belongs. It also has a cross index to work in reverse with either the ship name or shipping line.

The next itme would be to see if you can obtain these ships. Nathan Preston's catalog lists each model's name and date of launching:

Nathan R. Preston & Co
P.O. Box 2388
86 Bamberg
West Germany

So what else can be done with these more decorative ships? The earlier part of World War II was a confused jumble of nationalities on the high seas with "stranded" cargo ships whose homeland had suddenly collapsed. In this confusion, the disguised merchant raiders had a field day. So in your naval wargames you can add an uncertainty factor. When your British cruiser challenges a freighter, cast a die to see if the disguise is penetrated. If you really want to be nasty, set your timer and give your British opponent the two books and let him check your markings, etc. The real raiders' markings must be incorrect but the enemy player has to prove it. To shoot at a neutral ship means automatic court martial.

But don't get too close -as the Sidney did when it approached to check a harmless looking ship and got torpedoed!

The Scenarios for Tac 13 (Centurion) ③

By Stephen B. Patrick

In constructing the scenarios for Tactical Game 13, there were two basic limitations which immediately restricted the frame of reference. First, the era covered by the game was to be between approximately 100 BC and 565 AD. This eliminated the more famous battles of the Punic Wars as well as the battles which occurred when the Roman Empire had been transformed into a Greek-speaking Empire. Second, there was a limited number and type of pieces. This meant that there could not be a one-to-one recreation even within the context of one piece representing 300-350 men. Moreover, certain types of pieces would actually have to represent forces of a different variety. The best example of this was the use of Byzantine Cataphracts as Gothic Cavalry in Hadrianopolis.

In selecting the battles which would be presented, certain battles immediately suggested themselves as being most likely to be known by potential players (Gaul, Pharsalus, Phillippi). Secondly, battles of some historical significance were obvious

choices, even though not as well known (Servile War, Carrhae, Teutoburgerwald, Hadrianopolis, Campus Mauriacus, Busta Gallorum). Finally, certain battles were selected merely because it gave an opportunity to show various types of enemies (Numidia, Vercellae, Lycus Valley, Boudicca, Mons Graupius, Ctesiphon, Daras). Obviously, some of these battles were not, of themselves, of great historical impact but they did involve enemies with whom the Romans fought notable campaigns, such as the Parthians, Sassanids (Neo-Persians), Germans and the rest. Moreover, some of the other scenarios also fall into the category of providing an example of a unique style of fighting.

As far as problems in making up the scenarios are concerned, the most obvious, for anyone reading about warfare much before the Renaissance, is that of numbers. For one, history in those days was not always concerned with accuracy. History could well be a political tool. Thus, it was often suitable to overstate the size of the enemy army, thereby magnifying victories and providing reasons for defeats. Those battles where the numbers were available are indicated below. A further complication was presented by the number of pieces available. It was determined early on that a type legion would consist of 10 swordsmen, 4 light cavalry and 4 auxiliaries, the true numbers being about 3,000, 1,200 and 1,200, respectively. This means that the game can muster three full legions for each side on a straight proportion basis. Most major battles involved more than three Roman legions, particularly those in the Civil Wars. In addition, with the number of barbarian swordsmen limited at 40, it was still impossible to recreate the battle odds represented by Boudicca (about 10:1 in favor of the Britons) without giving the Romans virtually no troops. Roughly a 4:1 proportion had to be settled for.

Finally, there was the real problem of what to do about the battles where we either have no real idea as to the numbers or where the numbers of troops are available but the exact proportion is not. For example, Campus Mauriacus involved a mixed Roman-Barbarian force opposing the Huns without any real idea as to how many of what type the Barbarians brought (not to mention the mix in the Roman forces, by that time rather debased in composition). In the end, rather than omit totally these battles, an attempt was made to give some balance, at least apparent balance, for both sides so that a straight rout was not the immediate result.

In considering victory conditions, an interesting question arose: whether to base the victory conditions on those likely to be obtained, as a practical matter, in the game, or whether some effort should be made to consider the victory conditions which were actually acceptable at the time. A victory on the battlefield in terms of pure numbers may not be an acceptable victory, witness the term pyrrhic victory. This latter choice was selected. This produces the obvious result that it is very difficult for a given side to win certain scenarios without a great deal of luck. This is only right because certain battles require major victories in order to avoid unfavorable political repercussions. Recognizing the Clausewitzian maxim that war is an extension of politics, the victory conditions were an attempt to impose upon the player the problem faced by his historical counterpart - he cannot merely slug it out until he has one man and his enemy has none.

THE SCENARIOS

Numidia (106 BC). This was the first major operation using the Marian legion. The exact size of the units involved is not actually clear so here the option was for some balance since Jugurtha managed to lead Marius a merry chase. The margins of victory are based on the idea that the Numidians need only win a tactical victory to deal a major blow to the Romans whereas Marius needed a clear-cut victory in order to continue his political pursuits.

Vercellae (101 BC). Here, with the numbers of each side being known, the attempt was made to scale the forces within the limits of the pieces available. Here the margin of victory considerations were reversed from the Numidian situation: Marius need only stop the previously invincible Cimbri and Teutons whereas they had to crush the Romans to continue.

Servile War (71 BC). Again, there are some number problems here. The exact size of Spartacus' forces was never really set out, partly because, if large, it would show how wide-spread support was for Spartacus and if small, it would be humiliating to Roman military prestige. So, balance was opted for. The scenario actually needs some tinkering. It was meant to depict an enemy which was the equal to, if not the superior of the Romans in swordsmanship but which lacked Roman discipline (though not to the extent of a barbarian army). They should be able to attack three deep but not use the Roman relief rule. The commander rules for the barbarians should be applied here as Spartacus and his key lieutenants were the revolt and their presence in the front ranks was crucial to victory.

Lycus Valley (67 BC). This was a major battle with Mithradates, the Pontian King who gave Rome fits in the First Century BC. The victory won by Pompey established him as a military equal of Caesar and Crassus. Again, numbers are not known and some balance is attempted. Both sides needed to win a major victory. Mithdradates needed it in order to keep fighting, Pompey needed it for political reasons. Neither could accept a victory leaving the enemy with a viable army in the field.

Gaul (57 BC). This is one of the better documented battles in Caesar's writing; the campaign against the Nervii. Since the numbers are known, an attempt was made to achieve reasonable proportions. Since Caesar was out to crush the Nervii, one of the more warlike Gallic tribes and a constant thorne in his side, the Nervii had to destroy the Roman forces sent against them in order to be left alone. As far as Caesar was concerned, he could take some losses since he determined what news would get back to Rome and by the time any bad news got back, hopefully, he would have returned to win his victory.

Carrhae (53 BC). This is a classic battle between skilled mounted soldiers and an ill-led legion. This might also be called Crassus' last stand since he was killed in the disorder that followed the battle. Again, the numbers are known so an attempt atproportion has been made. Once more political considerations are paramount. Roman victory meant potential subjugation for the Parthians while a Parthian victory would have cost Crassus much of his political power, already badly in decline.

Pharsalus (48 BC). Pompey had the bigger army; Caesar had the trained veterans from Gaul. Pompey was cautious and lacked nerve; Caesar was in full command of his troops. In fact, the

victory conditions are somewhat unreal. There had been prior battles between Pompey and Caesar and there was no reason why Pharsalus needed to be the final and decisive one. They chose to make it so, hence the victory conditions which were imposed. Players can reenact their own Civil War by making the required victory conditions lower, fighting several battles, and working out some point system to represent the over-all decline or advance of the fortunes of the respective sides in response to the results of these battles. The end result should be the same: one battle when one side, badly behind on points, will have to risk all in a fight to the finish.

Phillippi (42 BC). Antony and Octavian vs. Cassius and Brutus. The Republicans might have won had they better communications. Antony was Caesar's right hand man and learned his warfare with a professional. Octavian also proved a quick learner. In this instance, a fight to the death was the more likely result since Cassius and Brutus were rapidly losing support due to the Caesarians holding the reigns of power. If they didn't achieve a big victory in short order, their army would have been without much support.

Teutoburgerwald (9 AD). The defeat of Varus' two legions by Arminius (Hermann), a German who had been serving with the Romans and decided to change sides, stopped Roman expansion into Germany. The Germans here were better trained and led than the typical tribe, though the scenario cannot handily reflect this difference, as they apparently were troops who had had some formal training with the Romans. A problem exists in actually playing the scenario since the hills mentioned in the Remarks column, were deleted between the time the scenarios were made and the final map created. The best substitute is to have the Romans enter in the southwest corner, requiring that they march northward until they clear the woods on the left of the map, about mid way up. This was an ambush and the Romans found it difficult to deploy. Since intelligence is perfect in the play of the game, the Roman forces have to be forced to undergo an attack while not well deployed if any attempt at realism is to be successful. Victory conditions are based a little on hindsight. Considering that Augustus didn't avenge the defeat immediately, one can assume that Varus could not have accpeted many losses without at least getting relieved of his command. The Germans could take losses since their sole objective was to drive the Romans back over the Rhine.

Boudicca (61 AD). This battle would have made the Chinese Army proud. Probably one of the earliest human-wave battles, the Britons may have outnumbered the Romans by as much as 10-1 (figures vary) but to get that proportion with the number of units available would have cut the Romans down to four pieces. This scenario requires an ad hoc rules modification. The Romans only won against such odds by backing themselves into a narrow defile, impassable from the sides and rear, which forced the Britons to come forward in a narrow front, reducing the odds in the actual front lines to more manageable proportions. This can only be achieved in the game by assuming that the slopes where the Romans lodge themselves are impassable. Get two sets of pieces and double the force of the Britons. Using that modification with regard to traversing slopes, plus all of the advantageous rules for the Romans should produce a good result. As for victory conditions, the Romans had to stop the rebellion

which fed, for the most part, on success. Any victory here, particularly at those odds, would (as it did) take the fire out of the revolt. The Britons, on the other hand, had to eliminate each Roman force they faced as the Romans could bring up new legions for reinforcement.

Mons Graupius (79 AD). This battle was the last in Roman expansion into modern Scotland. It was selected more for the literary readers than its pure historical significance for it is the Pictish leader, Calgacus (Galgaich) whom Tacitus has utter the immortal condemnation of Roman imperialism: "For robbery, massacre and rapine they abuse the name of empire; and where they have made a desert they call it peace." Another political battle in its impact, the Romans probably could not afford to lose while the Picts were fighting for their homeland. One element present in this battle,and omitted from the scenario in the interest of keeping the pieces at a moderate level,was the chariot, of which the Picts had a good number. Those who can figure out how to fit chariot warfare into this scenario should try it - and let us know how it works out.

Ctesiphon (363 AD). The Sassanid (Neo-Persian) Empire gave the Romans fits in the later years of the early Empire and continued to do so until their defeat by Heraclius in the first part of the Seventh Century AD. This was a major battle of the period and allows the employment of a legion in the format after Constantine. Again, numbers are not clear here so proportions have been selected for some balance. Victory conditions are hard to justify here as it is unclear how hard-pressed the Persians felt themselves to be. If they felt they had their backs to the wall, obviously they would accept greater losses in trying to win. Probably neither side could afford an indecisive battle, politically.

Hadrianopolis (378 AD). Called the battle that ended infantry, by all accounts a better led Roman force could have won and subsequent infantry type victories showed that the infantry was never totally eclipsed if well led. However, the victory conditions here make it very hard to achieve the necessary Roman victory. The reason is more clear from a look at the map. Hadrianopolis (Adrianople) is modern Ederne, a good day's ride from Constantinople which did not, at that time, have its famous walls. If the Roman army, which was, presumably, all that could be scraped up at the time, could not destroy the Goths, there is every reason to assume that they would have pressed on to sack Constantinople. Thus, a victory which would have been satisfactory along the Danube would simply not do so close to the capital. The Ostrogoths, on the other hand, could take their losses and try again another day, as was a fairly common practice among the barbarians. One change in the scenario might make a better, and more realistic, balance. The use of byzantine cataphracts by the Goths is, of course, unrealistic. The Gothic cavalry was not noted for its mounted archers. Try limiting the Gothic heavy cavalry to melee capabilities, only.

Campus Mauriacus (451 AD). Incorrectly called the battle of Chalons, this was the great victory of Aetius and his mixed Roman-Gothic force over the Huns. The exact proportions are, again, unknown but the scenario reflects an example of the legion "mix" during the last century of the western Empire.

Here the Romans were fighting Atilla, a personality. His force depended upon him, personally. His death would cause disintegration of his forces. For the Romans, any victory other than a bloodbath would suffice.

Daras (530 AD). One of Belisarius' first great victories, it featured the Roman cataphracts in a dismounted as well as mounted mode. Although outnumbered, the Romans used the trenches in front of the city, hence the earthwork option. The fact that the Romans were infinitely better led does not affect the losses each side was willing to accept. Thus, who ever wins has to win big as, in fact, the Romans did.

Busta Gallorum (552 AD). Though Bellisarius ran most of the Italian Campaign, this was the victory of the eunuch, Narses. It did two things: dealt the first defeat to the Gothic cavalry and showed that Hadrianople was not indicative of anything. The infantry, when well led, could still stop cavalry. Narses dismounted his cataphracts in the center and used them as pure infantry. Here Totilla could afford to take losses as long as he won whereas Narses could not afford to lose too many lest the Goths muster a new army. This ended the wars in Italy but an indecisive victory by the Romans might not have had that effect.

Fantasy. To pit the two types of legions against each other is a natural but poses some sticky problems. Unquestionably the Bellisarian forces were less well disciplined than those of Marius. That was crucial to the form of the Marian legion: it could not win if not well trained and well disciplined. It is tempting, therefore, to allow the Romans legions of Marius a lower margin of victory than the cataphracts. Even an equal margin of victory requirement might seem sensible in the context of a fantasy. Nonetheless, the option was just the reverse for the practical reason that, while the Marians might in fact do well against the Bellisarians, due to the latter being mounted, they could not follow up a less than decisive victory with a pursuit. The reverse, however, was not true: the Bellisarians could pursue and history showed that the Marian legion, once broken, was quite vulnerable to mounted pursuit, as Crassus found out. One change should be made in the make up of the Bellisarian legion. Through oversight, the heavy infantry forces were omitted. Cut the Oriental Cavalry to 12 and add 12 swordsmen. To compensate for the superior training and discipline of the Marians, try giving them the Fortune Factor.

There are, obviously, a number of scenarios which could have been given but weren't. The many civil wars throughout the Empire provide fertile fields for pitting essentially similar forces against each other, making use of the restric tions that are suggested to reflect the decline in the legion.For example, the Milvian Bridge, between Constantine and Licinius is an ideal battle for this purpose. The Social Wars of the early First Century BC also provide an opportunity for pitting the legion against a slightly lesser, but perhaps more spirited, enemy. The vast majority of the Roman wars of expansion under Trajan or Marcus Aurelius are not too well recorded for the purpose of reconstructing a specific battle. We know Marcus Aurelius whipped Dacians in his spare time but little more. Still, there, too, is some room to try your hand at scenarios. The field is wide open - try your hand.

"Playablized" Bastogne

4

by Leo House

If you have ever played S&T's game BASTOGNE, you either loved it or you put it upon a shelf labeled "Unplayable Games." The following is a set of rule changes which I feel makes the game more playable without too great a loss of realism.

1. MOVEMENT AND ENEMY ZONES OF CONTROL (EZOC) In the original rules, it costs 4 Movement Factors to move into an EZOC. I suggest rewording this to read that it costs 4 Movement Factors to move out of an EZOC, instead. This allows the German infantry to attack in division-sized units instead of having to break down into regiments. My logic is as follows: It is stated that EZOC is caused by heavy weapons range and enemy reaction. This means that the heavy weapons make it very costly for advancing troops to move into a hex . But, if the defender's heavy weapons can shoot at the attacker, the attacker's heavy weapons can shoot back and you have a battle! It should cost units no extra Movement Factors to move into enemy heavy weapons range, but it should cost something extra to move past the enemy weapons. So, the 4 Movement Factors to move out of a hex subject to EZOC.

2. FRIENDLY ZONES OF CONTROL. This no longer causes a movement loss to move into or through. This change is simply for the sake of playability.

3. FRIENDLY OCCUPIED HEXES. No matter how many friendly units are in a hex, it will only cost 3 Movement Factors to move out of the hex. My reasoning here is both playability and the fact that it is really easy to get into a traffic jam, but hard to get out.

4. GERMAN ENGINEERS. These units are utterly unaffected by, nor can they cause, "Friendly Traffic Jams." They don't count for stacking purposes. Here my reasoning is that they can't cuase much traffic trouble due to their size.

5. BRIDGES. I suggest cutting out a lot of 1/4" by 1/2" rectangles from thin poster board to represent "blown" bridges. A combat unit may blow a bridge by spending an impulse next to it. At the start of the game, the Allied Player may declare any bridges on or behind his front line to be "blown."

6. IMPULSE MOVEMENT. Impulse Movement upsets some people. One big hang-up is that one player has a very long turn, while his opponent sits in utter boredom. This can be solved by using the ANZIO BEACHHEAD movement technique. That is: attack/countermove/attack, In

the first impulse of his turn, the player moves and can attack. Then the defender can move all his units 1/4 of their Movement Factor (but no less than 1 hex in an impulse) and may not attack. Then, the attacker can move his second impulse and attack again.

7. ADVANCE AFTER COMBAT. Victorious attacking units may always advance into the loser's hex unless it is across an unbridged river or a blocked side. In those cases only units starting their Game Turn in the hex from which they are attacking may cross over; i.e., they cannot move to an unbridged river or blocked side, attack and then move on. In addition, they must follow the blocked side restrictions as to how large a force can get across.

8. ARTILLERY. It does not cost any supply units to employ artillery except in a barrage. In a barrage, the artillery may fire on just one Combat Factor of a unit. This can result in having to break down a large unit to take the loss. This disorganizes the large unit, but that's what a barrage does, doesn't it?

9. INITIAL DEPLOYMENT. Two of the 26th Volksgrenadier Regiments sneaked across the Our River on the night of December 15, 1944. Put them there, due west of where the 26th VG is listed as starting. The Allies will be real happy about this.

10. FIRST TURN MOVE. On the first turn, the Allies get no "countermove" between German impulses. This will make the Allies even happier.

11. SUPPLY ROUTES. For use with the Optional Supply Rule II. Supply routes are traced 8 Movement Factors from the Supply unit to the unit to be supplied. For the Germans, supply routes can also be traced 8 Movement Factors from a road east or on the "Start Line" if the road leads back to an edge behind the "Front Line." The Allies can also trace routes 8 Movement Factors from the west edge or north and south edges of the board behind their lines.

12. SUPPLY RETURN. Very simply, 1/2 of a player's supply units expended in the "A" impulse of the turn return in the "P" impulse of the same turn. ALL units are returned to play in the following "A" impulse. My reasoning here is that supply columns are being sent forward all day, not just in the morning, though their might be more in the morning to allow for reorganization during the night. Also, now that attacks are allowed in the"P" impulse, there is a need for more supply units.

In some of the foregoing, I may seem to have complicated the game instead of making it more playable. This was done to balance the game and realizm and playability were secondary. As to why you can now attack in the "P" impulse; I figured that people fought as well in the afternoon as in the morning.

Tannenberg – A Russian Plan

5

by Bruce Harper

That's right - a Russian plan. Without one, you don't have a chance as the superior ability of the Central powers to attack on a narrow front (due to the 3-2 stacking advantage) will assure the second player of a victory. In other words, in a straight fight, the Russians are lost as they cannot get Reserves to the front fast enough to defend and will lose a slugging match since the Austrians can stack three high and thus achieve 6-1 attacks on a line, whereas the Russians can, at best, get 4-1.

The conclusion is then reached that if the Russians put five or six corps on each of the three main invasion routes into Poland and spread the remainder throughout, they will lose by force, given a competent enemy, of course. The seemingly logical plan to use is to sit and wait for the rest of your army to mobilize. But this invites defeat in detail and so defeats the purpose.

This means that the Russians must attempt to seize the initiative early in the game. This means, in turn, that either the Germans or the Austrians must receive this dubious honor. First, the merits of an attack on Germany will be examined.

EAST PRUSSIA?

The advantages of this invasion are clear: occupying everything east of the Vistula will net you 30 points, and points are the object. Theoretically, then, East Prussia is worth six corps. Grab a few cities on the Vistula and the game is yours. But it's not that simple.

There is no doubt that it is possible to occupy East Prussia with ten or twelve corps very quickly. But the game lasts 25 turns and you have to be there at the end of the game. The German units can, with their mobility, striking power and replacement capacities, destroy a Russian force many times their size. Therefore, an advance into Germany will bog down 10 coprs for a disproportionate gain and will leave the rest of the front sparsely defended. Even worse, the limited rail capacity of Poland means that once the Russians are in, they will not be sustained by reinforcements. The Germans, on the other hand, will always be at full strength and so will slowly gain the upper hand. An early invasion of Prussia, at least, will fail. A later invasion is different.

GALACIA?

The object of war is to destroy the enemy. In the particular case of Tannenberg, if the Austrian army is destroyed or crippled, all else will come. Prussia may be invaded with overwhelming force, the Galacian cities may be taken or invested. Therefore, the main object for the Russians must be to utterly destroy the Austrian army. The

Austrian replacement rate does not begin until turn five. You have five turns to cripple the enemy's main weapon.

How can this be accomplished? When you mobilize, you must put yourself in the Central Power's place. The key to taking Warsaw and destroying the Polish rail system is Ivangorod. Therefore, the Austrian player usually places most of his army in the salient south of that fortress. The rest is usually put near Brody and Tarnopol, to defend these cities or attack their Russian counterparts.

The Austrian army is usually divided into two parts, one opposite Ivangorod and the other opposite Dubno. The first task of the Russians is to destroy these concentrations. No effort must be spared. Out of the 26 Russian corps available, 16 should be put near Ivangorod and the rest near Dubno. No attack from the Germans should be ~~expected~~ or feared.

Due to the general ineptitude of the Russian troops and of their supply situation, the surrounding of Austrian formations is not to be expected. The Carpathian mountains provide a convenient place to fall back on and prevent the destruction of the Austrian army. So you can't hope for a total victory in the south. The best that could be hoped for would be perhaps a 50% kill rate. This would leave the Austrians with 10 active corps after five turns, when their replacements begin. But they would also be in the Carpathian mountains, around Pschemsyl. Since the railroads would be wiped out, the Austrians would be counted out as a threat to southern Poland for another five turns, after which they would really become a danger again. But by then most of the Russian army would have been mobilized and quality replacements would start to come in.

The attack also has added benefits. The chances of gaining points on casualty figures is remote as 4-1 attacks would be the rule. 6-1 are really nice but do not reduce the Austrians enough. You outnumber them and have a 2:0 advantage in replacements so trading men is to your advantage. If the Austrians are reduced to a weak level, an invasion into Hungary is a possibility, as once they start to crumble it progresses in like manner. An Austrian force of 8 corps faced by a Russian force of twice that number would probably be insufficient even in rough terrain. If there is a possibility of success, invade by all means. It doesn't matter where you bleed him. Don't get cut off. Another advantage that can be gained is the southern cities can be occupied. If the battle goes against you, they can go very quickly. But if you keep the initiative, you can force the enemy to fight on your terms. Budapest is worth seven corps. Always have the supply counters ready to roll and try to keep the Austrians weak.

SUMMARY

Do not invade East Prussia until you are sure you can hold it at the end. Do invade Galacia immediately. Do not attack at 6-1 to avoid casualties. Do attack at 3-1 to try to trade men. Do not try to reduce fortresses. Do try to destroy anyone who might lift a siege of a fortress (which is just as good as taking it). Do not try for short term gains of transitory territorial nature. Do try to destroy as many of the enemy as possible to allow you to "walk in" around move 20.

Fall upon the Austrians immediately, heavily and with great vigor and determination.

Battle of Punta Angamos (6)

by Albert A. Nofi

During the latter portion of the 19th Century, the leading naval power among the Western Hemisphere nations was not the United States, but, rather, the tiny Republic of Chile. It was only during the last decade of the century that the United States began to build an effective and viable navy. Until that time, Chile held a definite position of naval supremacy in this hemisphere. Chile's maritime predominance was largely the result of her victory in the War of the Pacific (1879-1884) during which she defeated both Peru and Bolivia in a war of unquestioned economic self-interest. The decisive battle of this war was, without a doubt, the Battle of Punta Angamos (8 Oct 1879).

In 1879, the long western coast of South America was shared by Peru, Bolivia, and Chile.

North--South traffic along this coast is only possible by sea, primarily because of the existence of the Atacama and Peruvian Deserts, perhaps the most arid region in the world. Interestingly enough, the Atacama was also the chief cause of the war: its desert sands concealed a number of fortunes in nitrates. Because of the peculiarities of the theater of operations, both Peru and Chile had made a considerable investment in naval equipment. Bolivia, virtually landlocked, possessed no navy. The respective naval forces are set forth in Figure I.

Though outside the scope of our discussion, it must be noted that all three nations were possessed of considerable land forces. Chile had 29,000 men available on the war's outbreak, in April, 1879, and another 26,000 authorized. Her army was very well equipped and had a good leaven of experienced veterans from the Aurucanian Indian Wars. Peru had about 10,000 men available on the outbreak of war and an authorized increase of 30,000 shortly thereafter. Later, all eligible males were called to the colors. Her army was rather poorly equipped and trained and certainly no match for Chile's well-led forces. Bolivia had a very small and inefficient army which managed to do virtually nothing through the entire war. It must be borne in mind that the burden of victory was on the naval forces since only by sea was it possible to carry the war to the enemy.

As demonstrated in Figure I, there was a certain degree of parity in naval strength between the two principal opponents, Chile and Peru. In spite of Chile's slight edge in lighter vessels, the burden of the war rested primarily upon the four ironclads which were to take part, namely Peru's Huascar and Independencia, Chile's Almirante Cochrane and Blanco Encalada. These four units were the real embodiment of the naval power of their respective owners.

The relative parity in heavy vessels did not, however, last particularly long and in May, 1879, shifted significantly over to Chile's favor, primarily as a result of Chilean aggressiveness and, indeed, arrogance.

In May of 1879, the Chileans undertook their first aggressive operations of the war by commencing a blockade of the Peruvian port of Iquiqui with two small wooden vessels, Esmeralda

and Covadonga. Though magnificently aggressive, the move showed little prudence since neither vessel was of any particular fighting value: Esmeralda was over twenty years old and rotten in the bargain, and Covadonga had been captured from Spain 'way back in 1866. Neither ship had the ability to fight or run if the Peruvian ironclads made an appearence, which is precisely what happened.

During the night of 20-21 May, the Peruvian ships entered Iquiqui roadstead under the command of Capt. Miguel Grau, an able naval officer and politician. Unable to flee, the Chileans decided to give battle. Capt. Grau concentrated the fire of Huascar on Esmeralda, while Capt. J.G. Moore, of Independencia, concentrated on Covadonga.

Esmeralda, under the command of a man who had become something of a legend in the Chilean fleet at 32 years of age, Commander Arturo Prat, gallantly withstood severe punishment from Huascar and made several unsuccessful attempts to board the larger vessel. During one of the attempts, Cmdr. Prat fell dead, cutlass in hand, on the deck of Huascar. The inevitable result could not, however, be long delayed and naked courage is not always enough to bring victory. Shortly after noon on May 21, Esmeralda went down with flags flying and guns firing.

Commander Carlos Condell of Covadonga might well have suffered a similar fate had it not been for that element of chance which has always made a war a lucky man's trade. Independencia's gunners were by no means sharpshooters and a long but rather fruitless fire-fight took place between the two vessels. Capt. Moore, apparently despairing of sinking the Chilean by gunfire, decided to ram. Condell, realizing the danger to his ship, began to steam off at high speed into shallower waters as Independencia came up. Suddenly, the ironclad, having lost her steersman to a lucky Chilean shot, ran into a large and heretofore uncharted reef and grounded. Thinking quickly, Condell siezed the initiative and brought Covadonga about to pour a deadly fire into the helpless battleship. At about noon, having suffered heavy casualties, and with fires aft, Independencia ran up a flag of surrender. Before Covadonga could claim her prize, however, Huascar came up, having just disposed of Esmeralda. Seeing an immediate need to flee, Cmdr. Condell took his ship off to the safety of the open sea. Capt. Grau, unsure of the general situation, apprehensive over the loss of Independencia, and uncertain of the location of the Chilean ironclads, did not pursue.

The destruction of Independencia marks one of the turning points of the war in that this single act significantly shifted the balance of power in Chile's favor. The losses on 21 May did not come close to cancelling and Peru very definitely came out at a severe disadvantage. From that day forward there was but one single serious obstacle to Chilean domination of the seas: Huascar. So long as this vessel remained at large, Chile would be more or less unable to carry her army to Peruvian soil

During the months following Iquiqui, Rear Admiral Grau (he was promoted after Iquiqui) took Huascar on several commerce raiding and anti-blockade missions, with considerable success. But in the process, he overlooked an excellent chance to set the record right. During the Summer of 1879, Almirante Cochrane was undergoing refit and only Blanco Encalada opposed Grau. Had a serious effort been made to seek out and destroy this vessel, the situation would have been returned to something analogous to that

which existed before Iquiqui. Certainly the risks were not likely to improve at a later time. Once Almirante Cochrane returned to service the odds would increase again. That this action was not taken may be, in part, attributed to a certain psychological edge which Chile gained at Iquiqui.

On the morning of 8 October 1879, Blanco Encalada (F), gunboat Covadonga and transport Cousino, under the command of Commodore Galvarino Riveros, were steaming South off Punta Angamos, on the Chilean coast, when, at 0330, two ships were sighted in the gloom off to the South. These ships altered course from North to Southwest and upped speed to about 10 knots. Commodore Riveros decided to follow at 7.5 knots and the leisurely chase continued in this vein for some time. Shortly before dawn (0540) the two ships altered course to Northwest and were identified as Huascar and corvette Union.

Adm. Grau, when the Chileans had been sighted, had decided to get into open waters and then to try to run around the pursuing ships, trusting to his slight edge in speed to carry him to safety. His course change at dawn was copied by the Chilean, who also upped speed to 9.5 knots. The two tiny squadrons kept this course until about 0730 when, after having been smoking up the horizon for some time, Almirante Cochrane hauled into view off Huascar's port bow and running at high speed on a course Northeast by East. Grau, affraid that he would be intercepted, altered course likewise at 0800, or thereabouts, and increased speed to a full 11 knots. By chance the Chileans had set an unwitting trap for Huascar and the Peruvian and sprung the trap. Huascar was almost perfectly pocketed between Almirante Cochrane on her port side, Blanco Encalada to her stern, and the Chilean coast to starboard by some 20 miles.

At 0925, with the range at 3,000 yards, Huascar opened up with her 10" muzzle-loading rifles as the range to Almirante Cochrane was closing by some 230 yards per minute. Not long after, Almirante Cochrane's 9" pieces joined in the firing.

By 0935, the opponents were only some 700 yards apart with both running on a course East-Northeast. Blanco Encalada, meanwhile, was laboring to come up from a position some four miles behind.

Between 0935 and 0945, Huascar was struck several times and one hit had jammed her turret, seriously injuring or killing several of the gunners. Almirante Cochrane was also hit several times during this period, but the material damage was slight. At 0945, Huascar took two hits which more or less sealed her fate.

A 9" shell penetrated the conning tower armor, killing Adm. Grau and several of his subordinates while, at the same time, knocking out the engine telegraph and other vital instruments. A second shell penetrated her turret, killing most of the gunners and dismounting one of the great 10" pieces. The guns were remanned but with inexperienced personnel and firing became very erratic and poorly aimed. Cmdr Elias Aguire assumed command, but the vessel was in no condition to fight. Almirante Cochrane's nordenfeldt guns made it death for anyone to go on deck and the crew became very demoralized. Almirante Cochrane was hit once during this period, but not by Huascar. One of Blanco Encalada's 9" shells caused considerable damage as that vessel tried to get into the fight.

At 1025 Huascar's last 10 incher was put out of action and the fight was virtually over. For the next half hour, Almirante Cochrane and Blanco Encalada kept up the fire from ranges as close as 100 yards while Huascar tried vainly to escape. At 1055 she struck her colors. On fire in several places, filled with badly wounded men and sinking from open kingston valves, Huascar was boarded by Chilean officers and men who managed to keep the gallant little ship from sinking.

During the action, Huascar had suffered 70 dead out of a crew of 216 and had taken twenty 9" shell hits, plus a number of smaller calibre hits. By the end of the action, command had devolved to Lt. Pedro Garezon, seventh in line of command. Curiously, the vessel had not suffered any serious damage and within a few weeks was setting out to sea again - under Chilean colors.

What caused the Battle of Punta Angamos to have such an outcome? Quite aside from the loss of Independencia and the failure of Grau to seek out Blanco Encalada when he had the best chance for a victory, the fact was that Huascar was a poorly designed ship and an old one to boot. Both ships had a highly uneconomical disposition of heavy guns, but at least the Chilean managed to cover all sectors.

FIG. I. A Comparison of the Naval Forces of Chile and Peru in 1879

CHILE

Vessel	LAUNCH	TONS	HP/KNOTS	ARMAMENT
Alm. Cochrane (CBS)	1874	3,560	2,960/11	6-9", 4 smaller
B. Encalada (CBS)	1875	3,560	3,000/11	6-9", 5 smaller
O'Higgins (Cor)	1866	1,670	1,200/10	3-6", 6 smaller
Chacabuco (Cor)	1867	1,670	1,200/10	3-6", 6 smaller
Abtao (Cor)	1864	1,050	300/6	3-150pdr, 3-30pdr
Esmeralda (Sloop)	1854	850	200/3(?)	14-40pdr
Magellanes (GB)	1874	772	1,230/11	1-6", 2 smaller
Covadonga (GB)	?	412	140/8	2-70pdr

PERU

Huascar (TS)	1865	1,130	1,200/11	2-10", 4 smaller
Independencia (AF)	1864	2,004	1,500/12	1-250pdr, 3-150pdr
Manco Capac (M)	1866	2,100	320/6	2-15"
Atahualpa (M)	1866	2,100	320/6	2-15"
Union (Cor)	1864	1,150	400/12	2-100pdr, 14 misc.
Pilcomayo (GB)	1864	600	180/10	2-70pdr, 4-40pdr

Abbreviations: CBS = central battery ship; Cor = corvette; GB = gun boat; M = monitor; TS = turret ship; AF = armored frigate

NOTE: Each side also had a number of armed transports and guard vessels unsuited to service on the open seas. In addition, Chile owned a few spar torpedo boats. All guns are muzzle-loading rifles except those on the Peruvian monitors, which were smooth bores. These were ex-American Civil War vessels.

Huascar's armor was very poor indeed, as witness the fact that occasional nordenfeldt rounds managed to penetrate portions of her plate, while at other portions, 9" shells failed. Insofar as applications of the respective firepowers is concerned, Figure II demonstrates that gunnery was shamefully poor at this battle.

It is important to remember that one very significant reason for the Chilean victory in this war was their willingness to take risks, as exemplified by Iquiqui and the death of Prat. The Peruvians never seem to have attempted anything truly daring until after Punta Angamos, and then it was too late.

As a result of the Battle of Punta Angamos, Chile was able to transport her army into the heart of the disputed territory and, later, in 1881, to dispose sufficient military force by sea as to be able to capture Lima after an heroic battle at Callao, the port of Lima. Without command of the seas, neither of these operations would have been remotely possible.

FIG.II. Effectiveness of Fire at Angamos

Ship	Fired	Hits	Vital
Alm. Cochrane	45	0	0
B. Encalada	31	19	4
Huascar	unk	1	0

NOTE: Identity of ship firing specific shots is not clear but only 5.2% of the Chilean hits were anywhere near the waterline of Huascar. The number of shots of heavy armament fired by Huascar is unknown but she scored only one hit. Not noted is one hit obtained on Alm. Cochrane by Blanco Encalada.



FIG 3 The Pursuit