#10 S&T Supplement

The S&T SUPPLEMENT is published every other month as a supplement to STRATEGY AND TACTICS magazine. One, six issue subscription is $3.00 payable to SIMULATIONS PUBLICATIONS.
Back issues are available at $.75 per copy.

Simulations Publications, Inc.
34 East 23rd St.
New York 10010

FIRST CLASS MAIL

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Korea

by Stan Fishman

KOREA is one of the more interesting TSGs published. It is actually four games, each one presenting the gamer with a completely different situation. Game One covers the North Korean invasion of South Korea, as well as the U.S. intervention and amphibious assault. Game Two covers the Chinese intervention. Game Three begins at the point the Chinese offensive petered out and ends at the time the Chinese built an impregnable (to the U.N. forces) trench system. Game Four is the campaign game which ties all the other games together.

In general, KOREA is a good "game," providing the player with most of the same options and problems present in the actual campaign. However, there are a few holes in KOREA, and that's where this article comes in. It is an attempt to describe the more important factors in the Korean War, and how these factors are represented, or could be represented in KOREA. Included is a discussion of the mechanics of KOREA.

THE FIGHTING FORCES

THE NORTH KOREAN PEOPLES ARMY (NKPA). In June, 1950, the NKPA was well-trained and well-equipped. Its weapons were Russian of 1944-45 vintage, in good condition, and well maintained. This included a large amount of artillery, as well as mortars, machineguns and individual weapons. Quite effective were 150 T-34/85 tanks for the simple reason that the ROK (Republic of Korea) had no weapon capable of stopping them.

The NKPA was made up mainly of Korean peasants, used to the terrain and climate, inured to hardship and well-disciplined. About 30% of the NKPA consisted of Koreans who had fought for Mao against the Nationalists. These veterans made up the "hard core" of the NKPA as well as most of its officers and nearly all of its noncoms. These troops were completely devoted to Communism. The rest of the troops may not have been quite as fanatical but they fought well as long as they were well led. Perhaps the best indication of the effectiveness of the NKPA is the fact that in late August, 1950, it was able to launch a full-scale offensive against a UN force which had a 2-1 superiority in manpower as well as a 5-1 superiority in firepower, not to mention complete air superiority. Despite the fact that this offensive was launched against some of the most easy-to-defend terrain in the world, it came close to success on several occasions.

After the U.S. landing at Inch'on, the NKPA was shattered. Nearly all its tanks and big guns were lost. But the biggest loss was the fact that the NKPA hard core was nearly annihilated. This included most of the officers and noncoms. The NKPA never really recovered from this loss and its effectiveness was greatly reduced.

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK) ARMY

The ROK army had poor training and worse equipment. Their weapons were American: M1 rifles, .30 cal. carbines, light and heavy .30 cal machine guns, 60mm and 81mm mortars, light bazookas, 37mm anti-tank guns. They had no weapon capable of damaging the T-34/85 (except for explosive charges, which had to be placed by hand between the tank's treads to be effective). They had no mines, no recoilless rifles, no heavy mortars. Their entire artillery consisted of 89 short-barreled 105mm howitzers, which were considerably inferior in range and efficiency to the normal U.S. 105. Of course, these guns had no armor-piercing shells. Of the weapons they did have, 15% were useless (except the artillery). They did have 27 armored cars, 35% of which were unserviceable. As the war went on, ROK equipment was improved somewhat, but not much.

The ROK army was composed of Korean peasants, pretty much the same as the NKPA. Their officers were usually relatives of officials or the landowning class, picked more for their birth than their ability. The ROK army fought well enough when matched against similarly armed North Koreans or Chinese. The exception to this was when the Chinese entered the war: the ROK had thought the war over and that they had won. The shock of the Chinese intervention was too much. During the first week of the great Chinese offensive, the ROK army just faded away. The ROK army had almost no veterans among them when the war began. This situation did not improve much because of the high casualty rate. Nevertheless, the ROK army bore the brunt of the fighting in the war.

THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND MARINE CORPS

Generally speaking, the Americans were the best equipped troops to fight in Korea. The exception to this was during the first few weeks of the war when there was a critical shortage of armor-piercing shells, much equipment was defective, and the only tanks and bazookas available were useless against T-34/85s. These deficiencies were quickly made up. This was true even though the army was the victim of the belief, developed

after World War II, that all wars would be "pushbotton" wars in which the foot soldier would be little more useful than the horse cavalry. The U.S. troops fought, essentially, with the weapons they used in World War II. This included a great amount of artillery, which was the most effective U.S. weapon. A Chinese intelligence pamphlet distributed to officers had this to say concerning American equipment and how it was used: "The coordinated action of mortars and tanks is an important factor. Their rate of infantry fire is great and the long range of that fire is even greater. Their transport system is magnificent."

The U.S. troops who first fought in Korea were probably the worst "regulars" the U.S. ever fielded. The main reason was, again, the "pushbutton" war concept which had come to pervade all training. Thus, the training and indoctrination of the ground forces was sketchy and incomplete. Discipline was lax, the troops were in poor physical condition (in the first few weeks of fighting, the main cause of U.S. casualties was exhaustion, though most of the fighting and movement was on roads) few of the troops were veterans, the great majority of them being youths who had been lured into the army by a variety of promises: technical training, travel, etc. A few had been drafted. Nobody had told them they would find themselves in a situation where they would have to kill or be killed. The result of this became apparent when U.S. troops were sent into Korea. Time after time U.S. soldiers threw away their weapons and ran when attacked by enemy forces having a numerical inferiority of 2-1. Sometimes they retreated without any enemy pressure at all. They abandoned their dead, their weapons and their wounded. A notable exception to this was the U.S. Marines who were up to their high World War II standards. As the war went on, and the troops gained experience, their performance improved considerably.

UNITED NATIONS FORCES

All of the Allied contingents used U.S. equipment except the British. British equipment was of 1945 vintage and good. The troops these countries sent to Korea were mostly professionals and represented the best their countries had to offer. They were quite effective, and on the average performed better than many American units.

CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES (CCF)

Chinese weapons were mainly Russian, though there was some U.S. equipment and even some Japanese weapons. Though the Chinese were organized somewhat like the NKPA, they left most of their artillery behind when they crossed the Yalu. In general, the Chinese depended more on the physical toughness of their troops and upon their fluid tactics than on their weapons. One of the most serious deficiencies the CCF had was the lack of field radios. The CCF was forced to signal their troops into position by use of bugles an cymbals. Once the U.N. forces had deciphered the signals, this became a serious handicap.

Nearly all the Chinese troops were veterans of the long years of fighting against the Japanese and the Nationalists. They were extremely hardy, well-trained and it is doubtful that any force in history had better discipline. Pitted against an enemy who had a large superiority in firepower as well as complete air superiority, they were able, in their first offensive, to advance more rapidly than the German panzers of World War II. When superior U.N. firepower finally drove them back, they constructed a trench line which was 20 miles deep in some places and virtually unbreachable.

TACTICS

NKPA

The basic NKPA offensive tactic was to launch a frontal holding attack against the U.N. troops, pressing them closely, while turning both U.N. flanks and infiltrating lightly armed troops to the U.N. rear to cut off supplies and reinforcements. This tactic was highly effective against U.N. troops who were unable to establish a firm and continuous battle line. When the U.N. did establish a strong battle line, as at the Pusan Perimeter, the NKPA tried to muddle through. Against the overwhelming U.N. superiority in firepower, these tactics were quite foolish, to say the least. When defending, the NKPA dug in, taking full advantage of the terrain, and made the attacker fight for every inch of ground. This type of defense was hard to crack, but once borken, it was hard to reestablish.

ROK

ROK tactics were quite similar to U.S. tactics, the main differences being that ROK commanders were more willing to take casualties, the ROK army had much less firepower, and the ROK troops were poorly trained, often being little more than armed mobs.

U.S.

U.S. defensive tactics were basically to pulverize the attacking enemy troops with massed artillery , mortar and infantry fire, as well as air strikes. If hard pressed and in danger of being cut off, the Americans would usually retreat

drawing the enemy into the face of the U.S. air and artillery. This was once the troops had gotten some experience, the first U.S. troops to enter Korea being so inexperienced that it proved almost impossible to exert any tactical control over them. When attacking, the Americans tried to bury the enemy troops under a rain of bombs and shells, followed with a slow and careful advance by infantry, led by tanks when terrain permitted. In both offense and defense, the main concern of U.S. commanders was to take as few losses as possible while inflicting as many casualties as the former consideration allowed on the enemy.

CCF

The CCF's offensive tactics were all based on the following belief concerning U.S. troops and, to a lesser extent, ROK forces: "Cut off from the rear, they abandon all their heavy weapons. Their infantrymen are weak, afraid to die, and have no courage to attack or defend. They depend always on their planes, tanks, artillery. They specialize in day fighting. They are not familiar with night fighting or hand-to-hand combat. If defeated, they have no orderly formation. Without the use of their mortars, they become completely lost. They are afraid when their rear is cut off. When transportation comes to a standstill, the infantry loses the will to fight." Not a very flattering picture, but, with the exception of the U.S. Marines and most of the allied contingents, a true one. This being the case, the Chinese developed tactics to exploit these weaknesses. They attacked at night using Hachi-shiki, a "V" formation which moved open-ended against the enemy. Once the enemy was in the mouth of the "V", it would close about the U.N. forces, encircling it, while other forces broke through to the rear, engaging any forces that tried to aid the encircled troops. A major aim of the Chinese was to get in the enemy rear tu cut the roads. These tactics were highly efficient. When defending, the CCF dug in, to put it mildly. The trench line they built across Korea was impenetrable, halting the last U.N. offensive. A basic aim of the CCF was to get as close to the enemy as possible- the closer the better. When attacking, CCF commanders preferred to have a numerical superiority of 3:1. They rarely used more than that.

AIR AND NAVAL ASPECTS

Before the Korean War was fought, it was generally accepted that air power was decisive: he who ruled the air would rule the land as well. Thus, the USAF received the most attention from the Defense Department in the form of the best equipment, the most money, the best men and general top priority as far as the armed forces were concerned. When the Korean War began, the JCS thought that U.S. air power, alone, would be able to stop the NKPA. When this failed it was thought that all it would take to stop the NKPA and launch a counter-attack would be two U.S. divisions, because of the "tremendous" advantage they would get from U.S. air superiority. It actually took four U.S. divisions and the ROK army, not to mention the Air Force, to prevent the NKPA from taking Pusan, and it was a near thing. When it seemed that China might enter the war, the military again depended on the Air Force. MacArthur said: "Now that we have bases for our air force in Korea, if the Chinese try to get down to Pyongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter." The result of this was the worst defeat ever suffered by the U.S. armed forces. Probably the most abject failure of the USAF was the so-called "Operation Strangle," which was an all-out attempt by the USAF to cut the CCF's supply lines. It failed completely, though it reduced the flow of Communist supplies by a small amount. On the other hand, the USAF added greatly to the firepower of the U.N. troops, forced the enemy to move by night, provided supplies to isolated U.S. troops, and prevented Communist planes from becoming an effective factor. The constant bombing of Red troops increased their casualties no little amount. However, the artillery was more effective in this regard.

The Naval forces of the U.N. held complete control of the seas around Korea. They conducted the Inch'on invasion and their guns kept the Communists away from the coast. Naval air power was also very useful.

In summary, air and sea superiority were very useful, but they were not enough, not nearly enough. Korea also showed that human ingenuity can overcome technological superiority.

KOREA - THE GAME

MECHANICS

The mechanics of KOREA are both simpler and more time-consuming as far as movement is concerned. To amplify, KOREA is based on a division/regiment scale. Divisions break down into regiments; CCF armies break down into divisions. You may have no more than one unit per hex. This saves you the trouble of constantly looking under stacks. However, you must break down ALL units that can be broken down before you can move them. This consumes far too much time. It would be far simpler to change the movement factor of the division to account for the movement loss involved in

keeping a large formation together. In other words, subtract one. A 10-3 would be a 10-2; a 10-4 would be a 10-3; etc. Combat is unusual in that the defender can chose which of the three combat tables is to be used (he can choose the most advantageous one only if entrenched or on favorable terrain). Losses are based on the number of regiments destroyed. There is no retreat unless the defender chooses a certain table. Figuring out the supply rules is a nightmare, but once you have done that, they fit in well with the rest of the game.

REALISM

In general, KOREA has done a good job of providing the gamer with most of the same options the original commanders had. However, there are some holes that should be filled. One of these is that although the effectiveness of the U.S. Army, ROK Army and, to a lesser extent, the NKPA varied a great deal in the first year of fighting, no provision is made for this in the game. The following suggested rule changes for Game I would help:

1. NKPA Armor Rule: Any allied unit attacked by NKPA armor during the first three turns must use the pursuit CRT. The combat factor of the NKPA armored unit is doubled whenever it attacks in company with NKPA infantry during the first three turns.

2. U.S. Road Dependence Rule: If a U.S. unit is attacked at odds of 2:1 or more and has an enemy unit in its rear so that the first hex into which it moves is NOT a road hex, the pursuit CRT is used and Red casualties are NOT doubled. This rule is in effect for the first eight turns.

Another problem arises when the U.S. player makes an amphibious invasion. Obviously the best place to make such an invasion is Inch'on. In fact, it is so obvious that the Red player will usually station enough troops in and around Inch'on to make an invasion there impossible. This is not at all realistic since everyone on both sides thought an invasion there was impossible, with the exception of MacArthur. The following rule should help the situation:

Inch'on Invasion Rule: The Red commander may have no more than one regiment in or within one hex of Inch'on unless U.N. units are within five hexes of Inch'on.

KOREA fails to take into account the tremendous demoralization of the ROK troops when they realized that China had entered the war. This rule will simulate this:

ROK Demoralization Rule: On Turn #1 of Game II, any ROK unit attacked by CCF forces must use the pursuit table unless the ROK unit attacked is adjacent to a U.S. unit.

During the latter part of the year of mobile warfare in Korea, U.S. air and artillery support was significantly increased and tactics were modified to take advantage of this. The following rule can be used to simulate this:

Van Fleet Load Rule: Beginning on Turn #11, Game III, when the pursuit CRT is used by a non-Korean U.N. unit, the Red forces receive the losses they would get in the meeting engagement or pursuit CRT whichever is greater. U.N. losses are taken as usual.

So far I've commented on the faults of KOREA. However, KOREA really excels in several areas, notably in tactical options provided, which are quite realistic and very well done. The use of naval units adds to the playability and realism of the game and is also well done.

All in all, KOREA is put together quite well and is extremely interesting. It compares favorably with other TSG's.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The two main texts on which this article is based were Leckie's CONFLICT: THE WAR IN KOREA, and T.R. Ferenbach's THIS KIND OF WAR. Both were very useful and informative. Futrell's THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN KOREA have an informative view of the air war and THE SEA WAR IN KOREA, by Cagle and Manson, was also helpful

APPENDIX

Principle Weapons

Communist

Rifles: Soviet Carbine, 7.62mm and miscelleneous types.
Submachinegun: PPSh 41
Automatic Wpn: Tokarev 7.62mm semi automatic rifle
Machineguns: several types of Soviet LMGs, 7.62mm; the Coryunov heavy machinegun
Mortars: Soviet 61mm, 82mm and 120mm #
Artillery: Soviet 122mm How; 76mm How.; 76mm field gun.
Tanks: Soviet T-34/85 medium tank

U.S.

Rifle: cal. .30 M-1 (Garrand)
Carbine: cal. .30 M-1
Submachinegun: cal. .45 M-3
Automatic Wpn: cal. .30 Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR)

Machineguns: cal. .30; cal. .50
Mortars: 60mm, 81mm, 4.2inch
Artillery: 105mm How; various other wpns
Tanks: M-24(Chaffee), M-41 (Walker Bull Dog) light tanks; M4A3E8 (Sherman); M-26 (Pershing); M46,M47(Patton) medium tanks.

* Cleverly enough, the Russian 61mm and 82mm mortars could fire U.S. 60mm and 81 mm ammunition but, of course, the reverse was not true.

In general, the CCF as well as the NKPA used the mortar as their main support weapon. Each CCF and NKPA company had a platoon of 61mm mortars; each battalion had nine 82mm mortars. Both the CCF and NKPA used the submachine gun and hand grenade in preference to the rifle. At first, the NKPA made extensive use of artillery and tanks, but this was curtailed by the vulnerability of both to U.S. air and artillery.

Both the Communists and Allies used weapons designed before, during or just after World War II. However, a new use for an old weapon was found in Korea. This was the quad 50, an anti-aircraft weapon rendered obsolete by the advent of jet aircraft. It consisted of 4 high velocity .50 cal. machineguns mounted on a truck. In Korea it was used as an antipersonnel weapon with devastating results.

CASUALTIES (U.N.)

COUNTRY	KIA	MIA/WIA	TOTAL
Australia	265	1,387	1,652
Belgium	97	355	452
Canada	309	1,235	1,544
Columbia	140	517	657
Ethiopia	120	536	656
France	288	836	1,124
Greece	169	545	714
Netherlands	111	593	704
New Zealand	31	78	109
Philippines	92	356	448
ROK	415,004	428,568	843,572
Thailand	114	799	913
Turkey	717	2,413	3,130
U.S.	29,550	106,978	136,528
U.K.	670	2,692	3,362
TOTAL	447,697	547,904	995,601

TOTAL U.N. UNITS AT PEAK (APRIL,1951)

U.S.: All Army and Corps HQs., 7 infantry divisions, 1 marine divsion
U.K.: 2 inf. bde (5 bns); 2 arty rgts; 1 tk rgt
Canada: 1 bde (3 bns); 1 arty rgt; 1 tk rgt
Turkey: 1 inf bde (6,000 men)
Australia: 2 inf bns
Thailand:1 inf rgt (4,000 men)
Philippines: 1 inf rgt
France: 1 inf bn
Greece: 1 inf bn
New Zealand: 1 arty rgt
Netherlands: 1 inf bn
Columbia: 1 inf bn.
Belgium: 1 inf bn.
Ethiopia: 1 inf bn.
Luxembourg: 1 inf co.

CASUALTIES (Communist)

China	900,000
NKPA	520,000
TOTAL	1,420,000

[NOTE: This article was received prior to TSG's revision of KOREA which, as those who have seen both versions will note, contains some substantial changes. Nonetheless, as the article does give some background and as more people have the old version than the new and as, in any event, some of the areas Mr. Fishman touches upon have not been changed between the two versions, we thought it worthwhile to print. Ed.]

A Line of Sight Method on Hexagonal Grids (2)

By Paul F. Dubois

In tactical level games played on hexagonal grids, a necessity has arisen to determine line of sight with a problem in how to do so. An external solution to the problem is to use a straight-edge between the centers of two hexagons to determine which hex side the "line of sight" passes through. This has both practical and philosophical problems. To avoid arguments and to keep the game self-sufficient, we need an iron-clad, un-arguable method of determining line of sight. The following is a possible solution. It is couched in precise language, but once learned, it is a snap to use, even over large distances.

To locate the line of sight (LOS) between two hexes, called Xand Y, we first proceed to determine the range from X to Y, that is, the lowest number of hexes one can traverse to go between them. The paths from X to Y which are to be acceptable as possible LOS paths must have exactly this shortest length. It will be found that the hexes X and Y determine uniquely a parallelogram, with X and Y at opposite corners, whose perimeter is exactly twice the range. All possible LOS paths lie inside this parallelogram, so we focus our attention solely on it.

By n we denote the number of hexagons on the longer side of the parallelogram, and by m the number of hexes on the shorter side. Note n_m, and n_2. The case of "X and Y adjacent" is just n=2, m=1.

We put a numbering grid on the parallelogram, giving each hex a coordinate pair (r,s) with r denoting the number of hexes from the X corner along the n side and s the number of hexes in the m direction up from the long side. To be precise, X is (1,1) and Y is (n,m). (We count the first hex, to make things easier later)



Case I: m=1. X and Y lie on a straight line of hexes which is the only LOS

Case II: n=m. The path must pass through each of the hexes (r,r) for 1_r_n. Thus, the LOS may proceed from (1,) to (2,1) or to (1,2); then it must go to (2,2), etc. See the Multiple LOS rule, below.

Case III: n=m+1. The only LOS is a zig-zag path which proceeds (1,1) - (2,1) - (2,2) - (3,2) - (3,3) - (4,3) etc until it reaches (m,m) - (m+1,m) = Y

Case IV: n=m+r,r_2.

An acceptable path for an LOS must pass through each of the division points given below, and must be an acceptable LOS path between those division points. In other words, the division points given below divide the parallelogram into several smaller ones with common corners, and the LOS rules are applied over and over until the sub-parallelograms are small enough to be covered by Cases I, II and III. An acceptable path is then one which goes from X to Y in an acceptable LOS through each sub-parallelogram. Examples are given below:

IVA: n,m both even CASE II
Division points: (1,1)- (n/2, m/2) - (n/2+1, m/2+1) - (n,m)

IVB: n,m both even
Division points: (1,1)/2) - (n,m)

IVC: n odd, m even CASE I
Division points: (1,1) - (n+1)/2, m/20-(n/2+1,(m+1)/2)-(n,m)

IVD: n even, m odd
Division points: (1,1)-(n/2, (m+1)/2)-(n/2+1,(m+1)/2)-(n,m)

Multiple Line of Sight. If there are several acceptable LOS paths, which can happen because of the choices possible in Case II (or a Case II subparallelogram arising from Case IV) then all such paths must be considered, and if any one path is obstructed to sight according to the rules of the particular game, then the Line of Sight is obstructed.

EXAMPLES



See Fig. 1. AB illustrates line of sight for Case I. BC shows the LOS paths in Case III.



Fig. 2 shows several examples of Case IV. The dots represent division points. X,Y shows the case (4,2). XZ shows the case (5,2). XW shows the case (6,3). Note that after the division points were filled in, the path from X to the dot marked by teh arrow as determined by Case III and likewise on the other end. Finally, XV demonstrates the LOS for the case (5,3).

Great care must be taken to avoid Case IV mania. In this disease, the affected player applies Case IV where he should be using Case III. The most common example is the situation (4,3). The correct path for (4,3) is shown by XS.

The recursive use of Case IV is shown by YW, which is a (7,3) situation. First, the division point f at (4,2) is found. The paths from Y to f and from f to W are (4,2) situations. To find them we apply Case IV again, to fill in these paths.

Note that the method determines LOS: it is then up to the individual rules of the particular game to decide which hex sides block LOS.



fig 3

As a last illustration, we show in Fig. 3 a piece X. We assume that the heavy woods hexes block LOS. On each hex is marked Y or N; Y means that X can be seen from that hex (i.e., the LOS is not blocked) while N indicates that hex cannot see X. The ? are for the reader to fill in.

Panzerblitz Variants

3

BY Steven List

[It has been requested that a notation be made to the effect that the following have been discussed with Jim Dunnigan and "generally approved" by him. Ed.]

PANZERBLITZ for the Panzers

As the rules for PB state, the gameboard "represents a varied sampling of typical terrain in the Soviet Union." But as each board is about 8 x 2 1/2 km, we have an area of only 60 sq km. In this we find nine hills or plateaux, seven villages, four swamps, forty-nine patches of forest, 30.5 km of streams or gullies, a large pond and seventeen assorted hillocks, razorbacks and ridges. Varied seems an inadequate word, and while this terrain may be typical of some part of the USSR, it does not resemble the"endless steppe" the game's designer often has referred to in various design notes and campaign analyses. Herewith, then, I offer some modular rules covering the effects of terrain on movement and combat which will allow the player to "cover" far more ground with the same mapboards.

It should be noted that the general effect of these rules, if all applied in their extreme forms, would be to reduce the board to a featureless plain. This is fine for JUTLAND and parade ground formations, but awfully boring for a combat situation. A judicious balance should be sought. The suggested combinations are an attempt to keep things in bounds.

FORESTS

Option A: Ignore them entirely
B: Ignore the spotting rule
C: Ignore green hex sides
D: Apply only movement restrictions.

TOWNS

Option A: Ignore them entirely
B: Ignore the spotting rule
C: Ignore gray hex sides
D: Ignore effects on combat
E: Treat as plain hexes for movement purposes

SWAMPS

Option A: Ignore them entirely
B: Allow vehicle units to enter at a cost of 6 MF; 1 hex per turn for wagons and cavalry
C: As above, but reduce cost for all vehicles but trucks to 3 MF.

HILLS

Option A: Ignore them entirely, including adjacent slope hexes
B: Treat hilltop hexes as if they were at ground level; i.e. hills now resemble crater surrounded by ring wall

SLOPES

Option A: Ignore them entirely
B: Ignore brown hex sides
C: Neglect effects on movement
D: Neglect effects on combat
E: Treat slopes as Low Obstacles; i.e. units on slopes are unable to trace a LOS through any obstacle
F: Employ the Enfilade/Defilade rule (see below)

GULLIES

Option A: Ignore them entirely
B: Ignore effects on LOS
C: Ignore effects on movement
D: Employ the Defilade/Enfilade rule

MISCELLANEOUS

Option A: Ignore roads
B: Reduce plain hex entry cost for trucks to 1 MF
C: Allow all Infantry units to move 2 plain hexes per turn

DEFILADE/ENFILADE RULE

1. Defilade
   a. Gullies: These are assumed to be more like folds in the ground, rather than steep-sided ditches; as a result reduce the "exit cost" to 3 MF for trucks and 1 MF for other elements. Elements in a gully hex (including ford hexes) are considered to be "in defilade;" e.g., tanks are "hull down" Because of this, A or I type units, units using CAT, or H type units firing at less than half range are halved and have 1 added to their die roll when attacking units in defilade. Units in gullies cannot be overrun, but can be fired at from any elevation.

   b. Slopes: Units on slopes are in defilade if they are behind a brown hex side; i.e., if incoming fire must cross a brown hex side. The effects on attackers are the same as above. Note that this option does not half attackers in general when firing at units on slopes.

2. Enfilade
   This is the converse of defilade, which is the use of terrain for cover. Defilade generally causes the unit to deploy linearly, leaving it open to "end on" fire, such as found in (non-hex) Gettysburg or "crossing the 'T'" in naval games.



   a. Gullies: A unit in a gully is enfiladed when the attacker is in a hex that the gulley " points to;" i.e., where it cuts the hex side as in example. Use the hex side toward the attacker as a guide, unless the gully ends in that hex, then use only the side cut by the gully. Enfilading A, I or H type attackers (H at less than half range) are doubled.

   b. Slopes: Units on slopes are enfiladed if the incoming fire enteres the defender's hex through a non-brown hex side adjacent oto a brown hex side of the hex. The effects on attackers are as above.

Note: Defilade/Enfilade have no effect on M type units or on H type units at at least half range due to the higher trajectories involved. Units using CAT from an enfilading position are not doubled. All halving and doubling due to these rules is done before TEC and WEC factoring.

The intent of these rules is to ease up on some of the terrain effects so that the game board can be converted into "tank country" where players can employ pure tank units en masse, as was common earlier in the war. Keep in mind, however, that in the time frame of the game the Germans couldn't afford to employ tanks in this manner due both to a lack of tanks and more sophisticated Russian tactics. At any rate, it takes more skill to effectively employ a tank/infantry team in close terrain than to maneuver battleship-like formations over a flat plain. Be that as it may, however, the "largest tank battle of the war" (situation 10) took place in the Ukraine and not the Ardennes and the mapboard should be made to reflect 5this.

Rule options for simulating the endless steppe: Forest A; Towns A (or B&D); Swamps A; Hills A (or B); Slopes C,E&F, Gullies D; Misc A(B and/or C can be used to reflect soil firmness and density of grasses ando ther low growth)

For lightly wooded, rolling terrain, Forests B; Towns any or none as desired; Swamps A (or C); Hills B; Slopes C,E&F; Gullies D(or A).

Waffen-SS Addendum

by Stephen B. Patrick

Issue #26 of S&T ran an article on the Waffen-SS and in listing the units to which names had been assigned, noted that three, Florian Geyer, Handschar and Kama, were of unknown origin. A request was made that readers having knowledge of these names and their origins, please furnish us with an explanation. We have received some responses and, since the request wasn't solely for the author's personal edification, the following information is furnished, courtesy, inter alia, Daniel H. Goetsch and William Linden

FLORIAN GEYER (8. SS-Kavalleriedivision) was a Franconian knight, born around 1490, who served Albrecht, Elector and Margrave of Brandenburg, as an officer and diplomat. In 1525 he commanded the so-called Black Troop of peasants during the Bauerkrieg (Peasant's War). Geyer was evidently a better leader than most of his contemporaries as he had a knack of extricating his troops, even when

outnumbered. Apparently he tried the trick once too often, however, as he was finally defeated and killed in battle.

HANDSCHAR (13. Waffengebirgsdivision der SS [Kroat. Nr. 1]) is a type of moslem scimitar. It should be noted that Handschar, like Kama, was a moslem unit. The division symbol depicts such a sword.

KAMA remains a mystery. There is a river by the same name in Russia but the connection, if any, is not known.

GÖTZ VON BERLICHINGEN (17. SS-Panzergrenadierdivision) has been noted by several people to have been an historical character, as, in fact, he was. The historical Götz was born in Worms and, like his contemporary, Geyer, fought in the Peasant's Wars, though with less success, ending up spending a long time in prison in Augsburg. He lost his arm in battle and it was replaced with an iron arm, whence the division symbol. However, the article noted that Götz was a creation of Goethe, a statement to which several took exception. To be more precise, Götz was a creation of Goethe in the same way that MacBeth was a creation of Shakespere. Both were historical characters but the plays based on them have colored everyone's knowledge concerning these people and obscured, almost to non-existance, their historical existence. Götz von Berlichingen was Goethe's first dramatic success and, in his lifetime, more popular than Faust. In the play, Götz was depicted as an earthy romantic and it is Goethe who puts the famous remark to the bishop in Götz'mouth. If one thinks of MacBeth, one thinks of Shakespere's creation. So, too, when the Nazis thought of Götz, they were thinking of Goethe's creation. In effect, it is an interesting example of fiction outstripping fact and obscuring it. The real Götz was not nearly so colorful as Goethe made him seem.

Airpower in Miniatures Addendum (5)

by Jay Richardson

When Jay Richardson's article on Airpower in Miniatures was published in the SUPPLEMENT, it contained an address for obtaining FAST RULES. However, between the receipt of his article and its appearance, that address had apparently changed and inquiries were received as to where the FAST RULES might now be purchased. We inquired of Mr. Richardson who furnished us with the information as well as an addendum on rules for his article [ED.]

The only place you can now obtain a copy of FAST RULES is LOWRYS HOBBIES. The price is 75¢ plus 10¢ postage and the address is: LOWRYS, P.O. Box 1123, Evansville, Indiana 47713. The new president of AOS is Mr. Dale Bley of 2729 Myrtle, Madison, Wisconsin 53704 and he can give information concerning AOS to anyone interested.

The rationale for the following additions/ revisions is as follows: since the MGs mounted on the US tanks for the tank commander were officially called AA MGs, you ought to have a chance to use them as such. In bombing, I originally worked with the assumption that gunfire was slightly more accurate than bombing, which is true. What I forgot is that gunfire is accurate through the use of registering fire, adjusted by a forward observer. When it comes to who is more accurate, a dive bomber with one bomb or a gun with one shell firing indirectly, it is always the dive bomber.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE (addition)

	TO HIT	TO DESTROY
.30 cal	6 or less	3 or less
7.9 mm	6 or less	3 or less
.50 cal	5 or less	4 or less

BOMBING

Dive Bombers

	To Hit	To Destroy
Building	8 or less	12 or less
Tank	7 or less	8 or less
APC	7 or less	12 or less
Truck	7 or less	12 or less
Jeep/Small truck	7 or less	12 or less
88mm or larger gun	7 or less	12 or less
75mm or smaller gun	6 or less	12 or less
Men in 4" radius	8 or less	12 or less

Attack Bombers
(1' radius on all)

	To Hit	To Destroy
Building	4 or less	12 or less
Tank	3 or less	12 or less
APC	3 or less	12 or less
Truck	3 or less	12 or less
Jeep/small truck	2 or less	12 or less
88mm or larger gun	3 or less	12 or less
75mm or smaller gun	2 or less	12 or less
Men in 4" radius	4 or less	12 or less

To Hit penalties:-1 if target is moving 12" or more

To Destroy penalties:-2 if target is men in prepared entrenchments

Introduction to Advanced Napoleonics

6

BY Fred Vietmeyer

The initial installment of this article appeared in S&T #25. This second installment, as well as the third, will appear in the SUPPLEMENT [Ed.]

Having considered how to set up a Napoleonic battle, let us now consider terrain objectives.

In order that the game does not degenerate into a pure combat-effectiveness battle, the concepts of CE terrain and CE objectives may be used.

Historically, a Napoleonic battle was of two types:

1. "Destroy the enemy," such as the attacks by Napoleon upon the Russians at Friedland or Borodino. These were pure Combat Effectiveness, meat-grinder battles.

2. "Capture that terrain," alternately known as "hold that terrain" such as holding the bridge at Berezina as the final gateway in the retreat from Moscow. This type of battle can demonstrate real tactical skill, but can easily end up in a draw. Use of CE terrain can also force a crafty commander-in-chief to subdivide his army and players, rather than concentrate his forces in one gigantic thunderstroke. This is spectacular, but hardly fair to some players in a giant game who then have nothing to do.

Our concept will be to combine the best of two possible worlds.

CE Terrain: In this concept, certain terrain is assigned CE values. If the terrain is captured, the enemy's CE breakpoint is raised by the value of the terrain.

For example, in a 50% game, an army with 1,000 men would have a CE breakpoint of 500. If the latter has lost terrain with an assigned value of 50 points, the breakpoint is raised to 550. Incidently captured artillery can also be assigned such a number - we use 45.

CE Objective: Such terrain raises the CE of one side by its value, but varies from CE terrain in that it counts against the army that does not have possession of it. If it is captured, it counts against the original owner, but it also counts against the enemy if it is not captured.

Note that CE terrain usually gives advantage to the attacker, only, as the defender rarely captures any. However, CE objectives are to be valid for both attacker and defender. In addition, variable CE terrain may be used. For example, in the case of a rear guard action, the defended terrain would be less valuable as the game progresses. A final variation allows the two methods to be combined. A CE objective can be established which counts increasingly against the attacker the more turns it remains in the defender's control.

This is all very complicated, but such are the game theory frontiers of model soldier wargaminds. Bear with us and try it.

In the final installment, we will conclude our discussion of how to set up a battle and give some thought to reducing player tensions and altercations.

On Changes and Things

Those subscribers who felt that the shift from the booklet format to the "bed sheet" used in the recent issues was inadequately explained will be further nonplussed by the new change.

Suffice it to say that the original shift was one dictated purely by economics. The new change has an element of esthetics, which is a good element to inject. Working within the context of the large sheet of paper, we have been considering the means by which we might improve the general readability of the SUPPLEMENT. An early attempt, under the second format, was the insertion of intercolumnar lines - a novel move which seemed to improve readability greatly, thus showing that what the newspapers had been doing for centuries really was not all that odd.

The impact of the new format remains to be seen. Let us know your thoughts. Just bear in mind that, dollar wise, the basic means of reproduction and the "single sheet of paper" idea are the limits within which any suggestions must be structured. The SUPPLEMENT, by its nature, is experimental. It prints articles of less than universal appeal, something S&T cannot afford to do on any wide-spread basis. Monotony is not something which can be laid at the door of the SUPPLEMENT.

S&T Supplement

The **S&T Supplement** is just that, a supplement to **Strategy & Tactics** magazine. It contains articles that, for one reason or another, were not considered to be of general enough interest for **S&T**. For example, articles on games with miniatures are a regular feature of the supplement. Also articles of a narrow technical nature (such as mathematical game theory), or of obscure historical interest (such as South American naval battles). Avid readers of **S&T** often find the **S&T Supplement** a welcome addition. The **S&T Supplement** is produced in a "newsletter" format on a 14" x 23" sheet. Each issue contains the equivalent of approximately 16 pages of single-spaced, typewritten material. It is published bi-monthly in the month when **S&T** itself does not come out. The **S&T Supplement** has been published since December 1969. Back issues are available for 75 cents each.

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GameDesign



Game Design is published for those who are either active in or interested in the design of game-simulations. Articles cover not only the mechanics of designing games but also "case-histories" of published games. These articles are written by the game designers themselves. Regular features also include columns on rules interpretations for Avalon Hill and Simulation Publications games. Game Design is produced in a "newsletter" format on a 14" x 23" sheet. Each issue contains the equivalent of approximately 16 single-spaced, typewritten pages. Game Design is published bi-monthly. Back issues are available for 75 cents each.

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For those of you who don't know, and care to know more, there are presently some sixty-odd periodicals available which are devoted to conflict-simulation games. There are nearly as many conflict-simulation games available. But where to find them? The S&T GUIDE (for short) is a good place to start. Published quarterly, it contains about half as many words as the average issue of S&T. The S&T GUIDE is divided into two parts, one for periodicals and the other for games in print. Complete information is given on content, format, physical quality and availability (where to get it from) for each of the games and periodicals listed. Aside from the continual review of games and periodicals each issue also contains general articles on the development and direction of the games and periodicals listed. Charts are also used to present comparitive information.

The S&T GUIDE is published quarterly. One year subscriptions are available for four dollars. Single copies are $1.50. The S&T GUIDE is edited by George Phillies and Martin Campion. Order from: Simulations Publications, Inc., 34 East 23rd St., New York 10010.

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