

OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS

WAR IN EUROPE

Strategic Choices

by Steve List

When the SPI Art Department and I were struggling to produce the acres and acres of *War in Europe*, I kept asking myself 'How is anyone going to be able to play all this in a single human lifetime? — or will the game be passed on from father to son as a trans-generational task?' If so, Mr. List has a word of advice for your grandchildren: —RAS

The following remarks are intended to give players a handle on the monstrous *War in Europe* Campaign Game. This is such a huge undertaking that anyone who tackles it is in danger of losing sight of the strategic forest for the trees. Of course, much of this discussion will be relevant to the component games *War in the West* and 2nd ed. *War in the East*, and to scenarios involving either or both fronts.

Players should keep in mind two distinctions between the campaign versions of *WITW* and *WIEu*, however. For one, there is no explicit way for the Germans to win the former, the Victory Conditions being phrased so that only the Allies have conditions which can be objectively fulfilled (the German cannot force them to surrender no matter how much land he grabs). I would suggest that a successful German invasion of England, along with the conquest of Metropolitan France, is a sufficient condition, but the players should be sure to agree beforehand on what they will accept. The second major point of difference is that *WITW* requires that the German invade Russia with considerable strength by a specific time. *WIEu* gives the German much more leeway as to when he can invade and does not require such an invasion at all.

German Approaches to Victory

The German does not start the war with enough units to win it. Therefore, he must build some more. (How do you catch a bird? When you get close enough, put salt on his tail...) This building of units is a major detriment to German chances of victory, with production and military strategy coordinated and kept pretty much directed on the original goal. Ill-considered changes of strategy, or of strategic emphasis, were a large part of Hitler's failure to subjugate the world. Caveat.

Since German production is so important, a few words on the rules governing it are not out of place. Certain restrictions are given in rule 77.6. One of these limits the German to spending no more than 50% of his production points in any one cycle on air units. The German begins the game (Poland '39) with 23 AP, 3 ATP and 4 more AP on the production track. He begins the France '40 scenario with 40 AP and 5 ATP, plus another 5 AP in

the eliminated box. To accomplish this increase in the course of the game requires the German to start 18 AP and 2 ATP in the first four production cycles, at a cost of 150 production points. But even if he loots Poland and gets all his Swedish iron, the German can scrape up only 276 points in this period. An expenditure of 150 points is 54% of this total. So now you know why Germany lost the war; she violated rule 77.6(a) and had to forfeit.

Apparently, the rationale for this rule is to keep the German from making wild variations in his naval and air production, which was physically impractical. But by tying these to a fixed fraction of total production, fluctuation is built in if the German lets his expenditures vary widely. It requires a lot of arithmetic to implement and results in the German sometimes being forced to build stuff he doesn't want just to raise expenditures to the point that he can build perhaps one more AP. Finally, it seems capriciously arbitrary that the rule is deemed necessary for *WIEu* but not for *WITW* by itself. I suggest the whole thing be ignored.

Strategically, the German must make two major decisions before the game begins. Will he invade England, and will he invade Russia? Failure of an English invasion will probably cost him the game, while success will probably win it. Paradoxically, failure to invade England may contain the key to victory. Similar considerations apply to the Russian invasion, but England comes first. It is a make-or-break decision that could make the Russian operation moot.

For the sake of argument, assume conditions for *WITW* apply. The German will start the game with 14 mechanized divisions and about 90 infantry divisions or KGs with available draft replacements, and 27 AP in existence or production. Just to meet the minimum needs of the Barbarossa rule, he will have to expend 434 production points. Assuming historical conquests on the historical schedule, looting and native resources will make available some 2000 production points in the time before Barbarossa would commence, leaving nearly 1600 available for other purposes. This may seem like a lot, but some considerations should be kept in mind. No units completed after 10/40 will be of any use for an invasion of England in that year (and a later invasion is unlikely), and hopefully, the invasion will be ready to go by at least 8/40, meaning France is no threat even if not fully surrendered. Since virtually all the naval strength for an English invasion must be built from scratch, they must be initiated by 11/39 to make the starting date, and by 13/39 to be of any use at all. Similarly, the bulk of the AP and mechaniz-

ed units must be started from 13/39 to 3/40 to be available for Sea Lion. If all goes well for the German (looting of Poland and Swedish iron via Narvik), he will get only 500 production points in this period, only 278 of them in 1939. A maximum naval build would use 242 of these, meaning little else can be built in that year.

Even so, this leaves another 258 points for use through 3/40, from which a respectable force could be built (for example, 20 AP, 10 mechanized and 30 infantry divisions). However, the bulk of these would not be available by the 5/40 cycle, which was when France was invaded historically, which means that to invade France "on time" the German would have to make do with his Poland '39 army, slightly reinforced but minus losses, garrison troops and production cadres. Under these conditions, the German would be unlikely to even conquer France, let alone swiftly and bloodlessly enough that an invasion of England could then proceed.

A decision can be made to trade off naval units for land and air strength to ensure the fall of France, but of course any reduction from the paltry maximum naval force available reduces the German's Sea Lion chances further. All of the above has also assumed the German is not building U-boats, which means that starting by 1941 the Allied reinforcement schedule would start accelerating. If England has fallen, this is of little immediate concern. If she stands, the German will find himself in a race to build three army groups to throw away in Russia and recover from his losses enough to defend his European conquests before the Allies gather enough strength to waltz in and take it from him. In short, he will be losing the war.

But, say you, that only applies to *WITW*. When playing *WIEu*, the German can start the game with 1200 points worth of whatever units he wants, so he can have all his naval strength at the start and can concentrate on building air/land units. All he has gained is some time, because now he must start the war with a smaller army and air force (say 10 mech and 70 infantry divisions, 20 AP and miscellaneous items like paratroops and ATPs plus KGs for production feedstock). To build infantry from scratch requires 7 cycles, so any started after 12/39 will not be available at the start of the French campaign. Again the pinch is there; naval strength for the invasion of England will jeopardize the invasion of France.

As far as the actual invasion is concerned, the game is biased against the German anyway. Depending on his allocation of naval forces and Allied luck with the die, he can expect his Surface Points to last only 3-4 turns and provide only about 50% production to invasion

shipping in that time. He must also hold back shipping and naval strength to supply the units which do land, and these will not last indefinitely either. Perhaps 25-30 divisions (of which half might arrive as KGs) may be landed and kept in supply for a time. Unless the defenses of England are virtually nonexistent, such a force is unlikely to overrun the country, and once they can no longer be supplied, the German lodgement will become a large POW compound.

If the players have agreed to it, a German success in this invasion will end the game; otherwise, it will certainly cripple the western allies while the German builds strength for a Russian invasion and tries to recover lost ground in the U-boat war, which only means he still has not lost. Failure at this point should cost him the game. This is the type of situation that Rommel termed a gamble—a zero-sum masterstroke that should be used as a last resort.

For those whose taste is for something short of Armageddon, there is something else to consider—the economics of U-boat warfare. To match the German historical level of activity, i.e., to maintain a U-boat force so that on the average the Allied reinforcement schedule keeps pace with the time record, the German must start to build 95 U-boat factors in the 56 cycles prior to 1944 (an average of 1.7 per cycle), and 8 factors every 3 cycles (2.7 average) in 1944-45. This is a lot of production, 950 points through 1943. But by building a measly 17 more U-boats to make the average 2.0 per cycle (an increase in cost of 17.8%) in this period, he will delay the Allied buildup by a full 15 cycles! On 1/44, the Allies will get the units they would normally have gotten on 12/42. The 170 production points this would cost the German would buy 21 AP; by spending it on U-boats, it will cost the Allies 264 AP not to mention 6 Amphibs, 13 assorted divisions, 60 draft replacements and almost all the strategic bomber force.

At this time, an aside is pertinent. Under no circumstances should the German player agree to the use of the Allied Reaction rule, 22.4. This option would allow the Allied player to kill off your U-boats as fast as you can build them. While it would cost him 168 AP to kill your 112 U-boats, the lack of U-boat activity would result in an Allied reinforcement rate almost double the historical one, making good his losses in aircraft while you would have nothing to show for it.

Timing causes something of a problem when playing the *WITW* version. Because of the mandatory Russian invasion, there are not enough production points available to the German for about a year from mid '41 to '42 to allow building two U-boats per cycle. This means he must build 64 boats in the 24 cycles prior to Barbarossa, nearly 3 per cycle. This can be done, without even violating rule 77.6, while allowing the army buildup to the Barbarossa minimum plus a force of about 40 divisions and 50 AP to garrison Europe. This may not seem like much, but the Allies

won't have a whole lot to contest it with. Of course, when playing the full scale *WIEu* version, the German can rearrange his initial forces and not be hampered by an arbitrary allocation of production to the East front.

As another aside, care must be taken when varying the initial forces from that given in the Poland '39 scenario. While it is obviously better to build 50 6-5 divisions than 50 KGs and 50 draft replacements, upgrading the quality of the infantry will not justify too much of a reduction in its quantity. The "Westwall" frontier must still be manned against an Allied player undoubtedly more aggressive than the French general staff was, while Poland must be taken out quickly and without much loss. The sooner you can concentrate on the west, the less opportunity for an Anglo-French monkey wrench to bollix your plans. Within limits, there are similar constraints on any army built for the invasion of Russia. Increasing the airborne and mechanized units and adding rail repair units will certainly add punch to the invasion, but if the cost is a large part of your spear carriers, the 6-5 infantry, the invading force may be too "brittle" and break in your hand.

Having decided about invading England, the German must similarly decide about invading Russia when playing *WIEu*. A successful invasion of England or concentration on U-boat warfare will prevent a strong Allied threat in the west, leaving a relatively free hand for dealing with the Soviets. In these circumstances, a stalemate should not be too hard to achieve and a win may even be possible... For those who feel Germany has no business tackling Russia, another conservative course is open. The German can fulfill 4 of his 5 victory criteria without invading Russia. Of course, this means he won't be able to get a decisive victory in the game, and he'll end up fighting the Russian anyway as the Soviet player will have to attack him to take the Polish Wehrkreis hexes or knock Rumania out of the war. But in this case, it is the Russian who must be on the offensive, with only Limited War production to back him up, which should allow the German to win a war of attrition. Since hindsight is so good at showing how unreasonable it was for the Germans to expect to defeat the Soviets, and since there is no real need to try in the game, an invasion of Russia is, like an invasion of England, a gamble. It may be a lot of fun, but it is not optimum strategy.

As may be discerned, I am advocating a conservative German strategy, completely at odds with Hitler's megalomaniacal approach. Germany cannot conquer the world, so why try? Conquer enough to win the game, but not so much that you can't hold on to it. (Of course, Hitler's plans looked good on paper too. His problem was in getting carried away and going off in unwise fashion. So be sure you know what and why you are doing whenever you deviate from a preconceived plan.) Such advice applies to the operational level as well. Don't invade anyone you don't have to. You need Belgium to control Brussels, and maybe Holland to

get to Belgium. But Denmark? Similarly, stay out of the Balkans. Hitler went in it to assuage his pride over Yugoslavia and bail Benito out of his "Greek tragedy." But you are Mussolini as well as Hitler and should know better than to get involved in the first place. The only good that came of the Balkan adventure was the elimination of the cream of the British army in the Med. Don't count on your opponent being as helpful as Churchill was in this regard. The Balkans were the same sort of running sore on Hitler's war effort that Spain was on Napoleon's. If you will note, at the start of the Barbarossa scenario, 53 German, Italian and Bulgarian divisions are in garrison in the Balkans, compared to 34 in France and the Low Countries.

Of course, some invasions may be justified on other grounds. Possession of Narvik is important to the Germans; allowing access to Swedish iron provides 54 production points in the first winter and 60 in the second, when the Axis need is the most critical. It is of course worth more later, but by then the German is getting more from his safe resource centers.

If the German invades Norway, he must land troops at Narvik, even if everybody else lands in the Baltic. Because of the cost of naval escorts, he should assume that every unit sent will arrive as a battlegroup with the naval transport lost. Once he has seized Narvik, he should be able to hold it, at least in the short term. Because he can sail into a neutral port, he can seize it in a snow month so the Allies cannot reinvade. In any event, a garrison of two supplied 1-5/KGs or four unsupplied have a 5/6 chance of surviving an Allied invasion. Since the Allies will have at most 2 Amphibs, a two division invasion will get only 4-1 odds if it survives any air-sea interdiction the German may have.

Unfortunately, there are three other Norwegian ports on the Atlantic which the Allies could use to enter Norway, and the German will be pressed to secure them all. They are all within 12 hexes of Oslo, which should be the main German port, so both sides will be in a position to interdict each others' sea communications with Norway. The effect should be to keep either side from building up enough strength to evict the other and could result in Norway being a worse drain on the Germans than the Balkans were. Retention of Narvik may not be worth the cost.

If the German refrains from invading Norway, he may see the Allies do it anyway, in which case they would hold Narvik. The Germans should still be able to intervene through Oslo, but the situation would be similar to the above. For them to recapture Narvik overland would require a clear rail line to Trondheim, four supply units and a lot of time. Once Narvik is seized, then, it is likely to stay seized. If the German wants Swedish iron, he must be prepared to pay a high cost for it. If he thinks he can do without, it may be better to let the Allies make the first move and get caught in a Scandinavian tar baby.

Another invasion which may be justifiable does not involve violating neutrality, and that is an assault on Malta. The German has the two traditional chances to take Malta by storm, *slim* and *none*. The island starts the game with a garrison of 2-10 and a (1)-0 for a total of three combat strength points.

An air assault by three or four 2-5 parachute regiments, halved in strength would get 1-1 odds, and with Close Air Support to negate terrain effects, there is at best a 1/3 probability of a BR, which would kill the Allied garrison as well as the attackers, while of course any other result would kill the attackers and leave the garrison unscathed. The problem with this is that the Allies can then, in their turn, move a new garrison in by sea and restore the status quo. If the German uses air-sea to suppress the port, the garrison will be out of supply and allow the assaulting forces to get 2-1 odds, with a 50% chance of "winning" (1 DR, 2 BR vs 3 AR on the CRT). The attackers will still be lost though, even if the result is a DR, because they will be out of supply at the end of the turn. Since troops cannot be landed in a suppressed minor port, the Allies cannot regarrison unless they have an Amphib available, so the island will be open to seizure by an unopposed Axis air assault the next turn. But the above method still has only a 50% chance of seizing the island. Another method is possible, by deliberately overstacking. By suppressing the port and using six 2-5s and four 1-4s, odds of 5-1 could be obtained, which would guarantee success at the cost of all the air units lost due to lack of supply. If the port is not suppressed, odds drop to 2-1, with only one chance in six of any of the attackers surviving, and only four of them would be left after stacking is satisfied.

Any approach to the capture of Malta will cost heavily in paratroops even if successful. Beyond that, any increase of the garrison would eliminate even these bleak prospects. By adding another 2-10 or raising the one there to a division, Malta can be made impregnable against the Axis. And if they took it, they could not hold it forever. The rules allow the Allies to air assault with divisions rather than regiments, while they have amphibious capability to apply as well. The game is structured to keep Malta in Allied hands. The German may find it cheaper to neutralize it by suppressing the port each turn than by attempting to capture it.

In general, decide before invading not only if it is necessary but whether once you've got it you can hold it. Italian adventurism in North Africa is not too profitable, for instance, as the Italian "sword" is both brittle and dull. Unless you are willing to make that theater more than a sideshow, be content to defend it and plan on its eventual loss.

Soviet Participation

In a three player game, the Soviet player won't have a whole lot to do unless the German attacks; then he may have all too much to do. Until that happens, he may only be at Peace or Limited War, and if he goes to war

he may attack only Finland, Turkey, or Iran (all pointless), Germany or Rumania. Attacking either of the two latter will threaten two of the German's victory criteria, but the Russian will be on the short end of a war of attrition. He must be offensive, but limited war production won't allow much wastage of units, while the extensive borders must still be guarded, further dispersing his limited strength. This would invite German action in the form of "unit killing", depleting Soviet forces to impotence before triggering total war.

This is not to say the Russian player should never attack the Axis. Bucharest, Krakow and Konigsberg are all very close to the frontier, and careless Axis deployment may make a *coup de main* feasible. Such a blow would be actually a raid intended to reach the city and render it useless for German victory purposes (by inactivating a Wehrkreis or driving Rumania out of the war). Whether such a coup succeeds or not, the Russian should be prepared to fall back deep into his heartland to conserve units in the face of any strong German countermeasures. Attacking the Axis may also be justified when he has both weakly garrisoned his eastern holdings and has no reserves available, and is extensively engaged with the western allies as well. This should be a rare set of circumstances, as anyone willing to play the German should be canny enough to avoid the classic two front squeeze. But the threat may make him over cautious and thereby indirectly aid the Allied cause, while if it should develop, the Russian would have a relatively free hand until the German could scrape up the resources to deal with the problem.

Assuming the Russian will remain at peace, he must fulfill certain garrison requirements in his frontier military districts by 3/5/41. To build the units needed for this will cost 63 Personnel and 141 Arms points. This is less than the totals available at the start and which are received, leaving a surplus of 73 personnel and 31 arms points for additional units. With this, a force of 24 infantry corps with some 8 mechanized brigades could be built. Other combinations, perhaps with more AT brigades and fortified units are of course possible, but Peacetime production levels will obviously not allow building an overpowering army.

Total War production is another matter. In *MOVES #20*, Oktay Otzunali laid out a well balanced Russian production scheme for the first edition of *WITE*. This is readily convertible to the production mechanics of the second edition by anyone willing to spend time drawing up some charts and counting on his fingers. The act of performing such a conversion is an excellent education in the intricacies of the economic end of the war and will allow the player to insert his own variations where he may want them. But in general, the need during the first year of a German invasion will be for infantry and AT to blunt the attack. After that, more offensive units, like Guards and tank/mechanized corps, or artillery, will be required to allow

effective counteroffensives. Since the Russian will have to be responding to German actions, more specific advice than this is not really useful.

The Western Allies

Like the Russian, the Anglo-French (later Anglo-American) coalition is primarily reacting to German moves. Germany begins the war with the initiative and will not lose it, barring egregious blunders, until he is too weak to make use of it. This does not mean the Allies can do nothing; like the Russian, they must roll with the punches and effectively counter-punch, hitting "where they ain't". Until they have enough strength to meet the German's full strength, they must face him only where the German cannot apply his maximum effort. Besides such historical and near-historical campaigns as Narvik, North Africa and Mediterranean Europe, several other areas suggest themselves. As a general guideline, the Allied player should avoid violating neutral territory and confine himself to actions against Axis-held land. A major exception to this is Portugal. Lisbon can be quickly taken by a sea-borne invasion, ending all resistance and giving the Allies a strong foothold on the continent. Spain will lie between this Allied enclave and German occupied France, providing a buffer zone to give the Allies time to build up before the Germans can throw them out. The major drawback to this scheme is that the German may choose to stay out of Spain, forcing the Allies to invade her if they want to get at the Germans. Unless the German is seriously distracted elsewhere, this would not be easy.

The only other "nibbling" action the Allies can take against the Axis is prosecuting the strategic air war. Since German production is based on the smaller total of manufacturing or resource centers, it is only logical to concentrate on the type of target. If there are more Resource centers than Manufacturing, it would be senseless to waste effort on them. But initially, Manufacturing Centers are the only type of target that can be hit until accuracy column 5 is reached. At that point, concentrate on MCs located on transportation lines, as a transport line hit will also take out the MC. Except through transport hits, Resource Centers cannot be affected until accuracy column 9 is reached, which means eight MCs have been hit to this point. Unless the German has had a lot of luck repairing MCs, the only reason to switch to RCs as targets would be that there are no MCs left in range, but enough RCs are in range that their total can be reduced to less than the MC total. In general, strategic serial warfare is not going to defeat the Germans by itself.

In summary, the German has the initiative for as long as he can use it. He should use this advantage to neutralize enemies on the continent while avoiding acquisition of too many liabilities, i.e., neutral countries that must be garrisoned and protected from Allied invasion. He can play for high stakes, trying to eliminate his opponents and winning

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Any deep penetrations in the first two turns will result in the German units being pinned down and the forward Russian positions being unharmed. So, the German player will be caught between his two objectives of breaking the forward and the back positions without enough force to do either effectively. He is now committed and dispersed for the rest of the game and should lose. A mixed policy will achieve even less and probably disperse his forces more. So, the German must attack the egg which brings us to the basic precept of German play — concentration! In fact all the first three turns reinforcement should be used to break this forward enclave. These forces should ensure the demise of the enclave by the end of Turn Four, and possibly Turn Three.

The German's best chance of cracking the "egg" in the first two turns lies on its North side. If penetration is achieved the Russian commander should be overrun to unsupply the enclave. The German has to be careful not to be pinned by forces moving into adjacent wood hexes. Again, this will generally result from dispersion of German forces. On Game Turn Three the 46th and 47th Panzer Corps attack the South and West of the "egg." The 24th Panzer Corps moves to threaten both Smolensk and Roslavl, taking up a position so that it can move back if more force is needed to finish off the "egg."

2. The Middle Game

Having disposed of the "egg" the German is now faced with a decision; where should he go to get the greatest advantage. There are four possibilities for the German player to

choose from: he can move to the Northern Section, the "gap," Smolensk or Roslavl. Whichever he chooses must be attacked with the bulk of his forces, to the exclusion of any other attacks since he needs total armor concentration to gain victory.

If he goes North, there is no possibility of a direct outflanking maneuver. Also the terrain is such that it is difficult to dislodge the Russian, while the German can be pinned down. Furthermore, the terrain allows the Russian to form strong subsidiary lines of defense to prevent exploitation. One supplied division in the right place can stop a whole advance. Trying to overrun untried divisions in woods is a heart-stopping practice for the Germans (and should not strictly be attempted) since this is more than likely to be a 1-2 attack.

Should the German attack the gap, he is faced with the opposite problem in that there is nothing firm to grasp. If he is not careful he will flail around ineffectually and without supply. However, the gap does have the potential as a pathway for outflanking either Smolensk or Roslavl. The game will now depend on how the Russian has protected his flanks on each side of the gap. There are advantages to attacking either city. In the case of Smolensk the target is quickly accessible to the majority of the German forces, particularly the infantry which are his most effective combat units. The major disadvantage is that Smolensk is easily reinforced. On the other hand, Roslavl can be isolated from the rest of the Russian forces and may even be unsupplied. However, here the German

may become overextended (and unsupplied himself) which can lead to disaster.

We feel the choice of target depends on the exact situation which must be assessed separately for each game. Whichever the German chooses to do, he must protect himself from sallies from the other center of resistance. These will attempt to pin, encircle and perhaps destroy him. Remember a Panzer division in the open and surrounded is quite weak, although with all those steps it will be "an unconscionable time a-dying." The German protects himself by sheer weight of numbers and by using mechanized infantry divisions as a screen.

In the End Game it may be possible to secure Vyasma, Roslavl, or Yel'nya from Smolensk, while from Roslavl the German can take Yel'nya but should then turn back to take Smolensk. If he moves further East, there will inevitably be counterattacks from the side of the gap he has not attacked. These objectives will occupy him for the rest of the game.

CONCLUSION

Unlike the old victory conditions the fall of Smolensk or both Roslavl and Yel'nya should give the German a marginal victory (depending on how many divisions he has lost). We feel the game is so finely balanced that the old victory conditions are still applicable. Under the new conditions the best result the German can achieve is a draw. Like all the best board wargames this game brings out the three principles of Logistics, use of Terrain and, of course, timing. We feel it is bound to become a classic. ■

StarForce Scenario 10

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defenses of either the Rame stars or the L'Chal-Dah systems to the exclusive defense of the others. In option one you're trying to stop the PHH early and not let them get anything cheap, while in option two you should attempt to inflict losses and slow down the advance with the defending forces. Option three is not as strange or stupid as it might sound, for remember the victory conditions force the PHH to occupy systems in *both* of the respective league member holdings. I saw this done (to good advantage) in a game where the Rame StarForces headed for 61 Cygni at the outset. The PHH player, smelling a trap, advanced too slowly through the Rame stars, and didn't have adequate time to defend the combined units in the L'Chal-Dah system. If you do this however, don't be too obvious with your abandonment; bluff him a bit.

Probably the most important tactic the DL possess is to occasionally threaten Sol if things get a bit too hot for you elsewhere. Staging at 61 Cygni is excellent as you can be adjacent with one shift. He'll have to call his forces back, for if he loses Sol he loses the game. ■

War in Europe

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decisively; he can try to eke out a lesser victory by pulling their fangs and digging in to beat off their eventual counter attacks. He must decide on a strategy initially, and stick with it in broad terms or court disaster.

The Soviet and Western Allied players have little choice initially but to absorb the damage the German inflicts on them, hit him where it hurts at as little cost to themselves as possible, and when he is eventually weak enough, go for his jugular. In general terms, the campaign game *WIEu* should bear a family resemblance to WWII. However, the details will certainly change, and one of the most significant of these is the ultimate winner. ■



FEEDBACK RESULTS, MOVES 31

Rank	Article	Rating
1.	Designer's Notes	6.98
2.	Forward Observer	6.66
3.	Conquistador!	6.64
4.	Frederick the Great	6.54
5.	Trouble Areas in TSS	6.53
6.	We Love Them... We Love Them Not	6.53
7.	Napoleon's Last Battles	6.51
8.	Opening MOVES	6.31
9.	Torgau	6.31
10.	Footnotes	6.18
11.	FireFight	6.01
12.	Playback	5.83
13.	Dissecting a Combat Results Table	5.21
This Issue (overall)		6.75